Arbitration and Conflicts of Laws A Study of Benevolent Compulsion by Phillips, Philip G.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 19
Issue 2 February 1934 Article 2
Arbitration and Conflicts of Laws A Study of
Benevolent Compulsion
Philip G. Phillips
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Philip G. Phillips, Arbitration and Conflicts of Laws A Study of Benevolent Compulsion , 19 Cornell L. Rev. 197 (1934)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol19/iss2/2
ARBITRATION AND CONFLICTS OF LAWS: A
STUDY OF BENEVOLENT COMPULSION
PHILIP G. PHILLIPS*
INTRODUCTION
Renvoi seems at last displaced as the most puzzling rule in con-
flicts of laws. The modem Draft State Arbitration Acts, aimed to
put at an end commercial strife and assure speedy disposition of
business controversies, when applied to arbitrations involving resi-
dents of different states, offer situations far more puzzling than the
renvoi. In the latter at least our minds wandered from the law of
state A to state B and back again until we decided to call a halt; and a
solution is easily reached. But in this new field of arbitration, we can'
furnish employment not only to lawyers in the two jurisdicti6ns of the
parties, but in many others, and the possibility of a mad race between
jurisdictions, not unlike the old race for corporate business or the
modem divorce racket. At least, we lawyers are not to blame this
time-for the modem commercial arbitration acts have been passed
at the alleged insistence of business, passed in the exact form re-.
quested by business, passed despite the opposition of the Bar.'
THE MODERN ARBITRATION STATUTES
These acts have proven one of the most prolific source of writing in
recent years. Much- of it has been propaganda, ghost written or
otherwise; a lot of it deep examination of new legal trends. Despite
this, there has been little critical analysis. It is generally assumed
that the modem arbitration acts must be right; any decision which
limits their scope is ipso facto bad; and any one expanding it, is ipso
facto good. Because of their zeal for the arbitration process, most
writers have assumed that the new Arbitration Law was entitled to
the same feeling.
The modem arbitration acts have been passed in twelve states2
*Member of the Massachusetts Bar.
'See (1925) 50 A. B. A. REP. 135 et seg., 577 et. seg.; (1931) 36 COMMERCUL L. J.
145. But cf. Sturges, Arbitration Under the North Carolina Statute (1928) 6 N. C. L.
REv. 363.
2We refer here to the Draft State Arbitration Act of the American Arbitration
Association. It has been passed in: ARIz. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) as amended
by Laws 1929, c. 72, r-4; CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. (Deering, 1931) §§128o-93;
CONN. GEN. STAT. (1929) §§584o-56; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart. 1932) §§4o5-22;
N. H. Pub. LAWS (1929) c. r47; N. J. ComP. STAT. (Supp. 1925) §§9, 21-36; N. Y.
ARBiTRATION LAw(192O), as added by Laws 1923, c. 2 §6-a, id.1927, c. 352; N. Y.
Civ. PRAc. Act §§1448-65, x469; Onio GEN. CODE (Page, 1932) §12148 (I-I7);
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whose main purpose is to make all arbitration agreements irrevocable
and specifically enforceable. It will be recalled that the old common
law was that such agreements were revocable, in fact a provision in a
contract to arbitrate a dispute thereafter arising out of it was said to
be void and condemned by the courts.3 This the new laws changed,
aiming to strengthen arbitration agreements, and thereby increase the
use of the arbitration process. In order to further their purposes, the
proponents of commercial arbitration had a similar law passed
through Congress applying to maritime transactions and disputes
involving interstate commerce.4 It was hoped that this would make
it possible to enforce arbitration agreements in jurisdictions whose
state courts did not enforce them.
The advantages of arbitration in the settlement of certain types
of business disputes are so well known that they need not be set out
here. 5 Unfortunately the advantages of the new arbitration acts are
not so apparent. The net result seems to have been the plaguing of
the New York courts with untold litigation regarding the statute;$
and the absolute absence of its use in most of the other states which
ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) §§2I-1o1, 21-io3, Laws 1931, Act No. 38; PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, Supp. 1932) tit. 5, §§161-8I; R. I. ACTS AND RESOLVES 1929, C. 1408,
§§1-I8; WIS. STAT. (1931) 298.01-298.I8. The acts are exhaustively treated in:
STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS (1930). See also Popkin,
Judicial Construction of the New ]fork Arbitration Law of z2o (1925) II CORNELL
LAW QUARTERLY 329; Frankel, The New York Arbitration Law (1932) 32 COL L.
REV. 623. An unusually good succinct statement of the arbitration statutes and
law in general, together with a full bibliography of law review authorities may be
found in CHAsEE AND SIMPSON, CASES ON EQUITY (933) 552 ff. The Commis-
sioners on Uniform Laws have an arbitration act of their own, the so-called Uni-
form Arbitration Act. It does not contain the specific enforcement provisions
of the Draft State Act, and applies only to agreements to arbitrate an existing
dispute. It has been passed only in four states: NEV. COMP. STAT. (Hillyer, 1929)
§§51O-34; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §§898a-898x; UTAH, REV. STAT.
(3933) tit 304, c. 36 §§I-22; Wyo. REV. STAT. ANN. (1931) §§7-IO to 7-24. It is
bitterly opposed by the proponents of the Draft State Act.
3See for exaniple Cocalis v. Nazlides, 308 Ill. 152, 139 N. E. 95 (3923); cf.
Hulvpy, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes (1929) 15 VA. L. REV. 238--239.
443 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U. S.C. §§I-I 5 (1926). For articles on the act in general
see Baum and Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements
in the Federal Courts (1931) 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 238, 428; Poor, Arbitration
Under the Federal Statute (3927) 36 YALE L. J. 667; Cohen and Dayton, The New
Federal Arbitration Law (1926) 32 VA. L. REV. 265.
WFor a collection of several articles setting forth the advantages of arbitration
see (1925) 9 J. AMER. JUDICATURE Soc. No. 3.
5A study of the daily issues of the NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL or of the recent
issues of the WEST DIGEST will furnish ample proof of this statement. The
amount of litigation over the arbitration statute is nothing short of startling.
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have passed the act, for the simple reason that arbitration does not
seem to have spread to those states. The plaguing of New York
courts would not be the cause of worry to most of us outside her
jurisdiction were it not for the fact that the New York Arbitration
Law has been the cause of litigation in other states-and most re-
cently we find the Chancery Court of little Delaware besieged by
high-powered counsel from the neighboring metropolis with claims of
"full faith and credit" all because of this simple act which was sup-
posed to end litigation. And the United States Arbitration Act, far
from simplifying the state and federal law, has made it more compli-
cated, and instead of making it difficult to revoke arbitration agree-
ments, in some instances has furnished skillful counsel with new
devices for evading them.
The Draft State Arbitration provides three methods of enforcing an
arbitration agreement: (i) direct specific enforcement, viz. an order to
arbitrate; (2) collateral enforcement, viz. the appointment of arbitra-
tors by court order; and (3) indirect specific enforcement, viz. the
staying of an action brought in violation of an agreement to arbi-
trate. We have heretofore examined at some length the direct enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements under these acts ;7 and in view of its
peculiar bearing on interstate arbitration, now a problem beginning
to assume large proportions, we will here examine the indirect method
of enforcing arbitration agreements as prescribed in these new acts.
We will further examine the peculiar jurisdictional problems raised
by the Federal Arbitration Act, which obviously bear a close relation
to arbitration-conflicts-of-law; and touch also the problem of con-
flicts in arbitration laws, their extraterritorial force, ex parte arbitra-
tions and the enforcement in state B of an arbitration award obtained
in state A. We will examine methods used to evade the arbitration
laws in this connection, and try to see if there is some remedy for the
situation. The interstate angle has made overly complicated a
problem already difficult.
The staying of an action brought in violation of an arbitration
agreement was used at common law under certain circumstances. In
many states, if a dispute already the subject of an action was sub-
mitted to arbitration, the submission agreement automatically
stayed the action, and a court order to that effect would be granted. 8
A general arbitration clause (that is to say a provision in a contract
to submit disputes thereafter arising to arbitration) would not be
TPhillips, The Paradox in Arbitration Law: Compulsion as Applied to Voluntary
Proceeding (1933) 46 HARv. L. Rxv. 1258.
8Schlanbusch v. Schlanbusch, 102 Neb. 462, x67 N. W. 557 (1gi8).
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enforced, but if certain disputes, as distinguished from all disputes,
were to be determined by arbitration as a condition precedent to
liability, the courts would stay any action brought until the arbitra-
tion was had.9 But the clause had to be carefully drawn, and could
not be too general in its nature. As was stated in Oregon Short Line
v. Titus Coal Company:1 0
"Where, however, the contract contains no covenant, express
or implied, indicating that arbitration of disputes shall be a con-
dition precedent to a right of action, but there is simply a cove-
nant to pay and another covenant to arbitrate, they are distinct
and collateral, and the covenant to arbitrate is not in such a
case a condition precedent."
In Colorado and Washington, however, contrary to the general rule,
and without any statutory provision, all arbitration clauses, regard-
less of their nature, would be enforced as a condition precedent to an
action;" and the Massachusetts Arbitration Act specifically so
provides.'2
The Draft State Arbitration Act changes the general rule. Any
action brought in violation of an arbitration clause or agreement will
be stayed. The language is mandatory on the court, and it would
seem that even provisional remedies would be brought within its
purview. The provision of the New York Act regarding stay of
action follows:
"If any suit or proceeding be brought upon any issue other-
wise referable to arbitration under a contract or submission...
the supreme court, or a judge thereof, upon being satisfied that
the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to
arbitration under a contract containing a provision for arbitra-
tion or under a submission.., shall stay the trial of the action
until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms
of the agreement.' 3
This is the method, and the only method used in England for the
specific enforcement of arbitration agreements, except that the court
'See Blodgett Company v. Bebe Company, 19o Cal. 665, 214 Pac. 38, (1923)
and the elaborate citation of cases in (1923) 26 A. L. R. 107o. The courts of
Nebraska, however, would not thus enforce such agreements. Hartford, Con-
necticut Fire Insurance Company v. Hon, 66 Neb. 555, 92 N. W. 736 (1902).
1035 F. (2d) 919, 923 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929).
"See Ezell v. Rocky Mountain Bean and Elevator Company, 76 Colo. 409, 232
Pac. 68o (1925); Zindorf Construction Company v. Western American Company,
27 Wash. 31, 67 Pac. 374 (1901).
2MAss. GEN. LAWS (1932) C. 251, §21.
'
3NEW YORK ARBITRATIoN LAW (I920) §5. Any important differences in the
other state acts will be pointed out in the text.
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in England is given discretion to deny the motion to stay the action
when it seems equitable for it to do so.14 The idea of undiscretionary
equitable relief is shocking to the English mind.15
Naturally the petitioner in a motioln to stay an action must show an
arbitrable dispute,'6 and the procedure for the stay is somewhat
similar to that of a motion to compel,'17 except that no jury trial may
be had as to the existence of the contract to arbitrate or default in
proceeding as is the case in an order for direct enforcement of the
arbitration agreement' 8
Some speed must be used in asserting one's right to compel arbitra-
tion, and frequently the laches of the plaintiff are urged as a defense
to equitable enforcement of an arbitration agreement.' 9 How much
speed the petitioner should use is a matter to determine in accordance
with the terms of the contract and the facts of the case.20 If the con-
tract makes for a speedy demand for arbitration, this must be done;21
on the other hand, there are times when the situation is such that the
fact that arbitration has not been demanded for a long period of
"
4 Cf. ARBITRATION ACT 1889, §§I, 4; 52 & 53 VIcT. c. 49. "The present position,
therefore of agreements to refer to private tribunals may be shortly expressed thus.
The law will not enforce the specific performance of such agreements, but if duly
appealed to, it has the power in its discretion to refuse a party the alternative of
having a dispute settled by a court of law, and thus leaving him the position of
having no other remedy than to proceed to arbitration." Doleman and Sons v.
Ossett Corporation, (1912) 3 K. B. 257, 269, per Fletcher-Moulton, J. See also
Locus Poenitentiae in Arbitrations (1929) 167 LAw TIMES 432. Provision is made
in the English Act for the court appointment of arbitrators, ARBITRATION ACT
1889, §5.
15Arbitration with Foreigners (1924) 159 LAw TIMES 13o; REPORT OF COMMITTEE
ON ARBITRATION presented by Lord High Chancellor to Parliament, 1927, §43.
16 Cf. Matter of General Silk Importing Company, Inc., 2oo App. Div. 786, 792,
194 N. Y. Supp. I5 (Ist Dept. 1922). Counsel have gone to all kinds of extremes
to prove that the action is not within the scope of the arbitration clause in order
to evade arbitration, especially in rigorous standardized contracts. The latest
ruse seems to be to bring an action in tort despite the fact that the relations be-
tween the parties originated in a contract containing a general arbitration clause.
Thus in Reichlin v. Reliable Van and Storage Co., N. Y. L. J., Oct. 31, 1933, A
stored goods with B on a standardized warehousemen's contract. The allegation
was conversion instead of for damages under the contract, and the court. refuses
to stay the action despite the arbitration clause in the contract.
17 Cf. Street and Finney Inc. v. Kelley, N. Y. L. J., Aug. 24, 1929.
"
8 Gold. v. Newburger, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 20, 1930.
"In re Richards, N. Y. L. J., Mar. 29, 1929.
20Matter of Van Neyenrod, N. Y. L. J., Feb. i9, 1924.
2"Matter of Smith, I 19 Misc. 324, 198 N. Y. Supp. 237 (1922), contract provided
for demand of arbitration within ten days after dispute arose; In re California
Packing Corporation, N. Y. L. J., June 6, 1931, arbitration "immediately" after
dispute arises.
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time after a dispute arose wQuld not affect the petitioner's right to
obtain equitable enforcement of his arbitration agreement." A few
cases take the position that whether there has been a waiver of the
benefits of the arbitration clause by a delay in making a claim is a
matter to be determined by the arbitrators.2
These provisions for staying an action because of an arbitration
clause have impelled many efforts to block honest attempts to obtain
justice. If two business men, after a dispute arises, agree to arbitrate,
there is rarely any difficulty. The fact that they were sufficiently
friendly then to agree to arbitrate, augurs well for the success of the
arbitration proceeding. The remarks in this paper, and the cases
cited, apply almost exclusively to arbitration clauses in contracts
executed prior to dispute. A and B, on the friendliest terms make a
contract and include therein a clause providing for the arbitration of
all disputes thereafter arising. Sometimes bad feeling develops as a
result of disputes and A, no longer-desiring to settle them by "friendly"
arbitration, commences suit. B in no hurry to have the matter
settled, joins issue and long months are consumed waiting for trial. If
the defendant in the suit then moves to stay the action on the ground
of the arbitration clause, he will if successful gain more delay. It is
obvious that a doctrine of waiver would have to be built up, and there
now exists a fairly well-formed set of rules regarding it.
In the first place the previous refusal of a party to arbitrate will bar
him from thereafter claiming the benefits of an arbitration clause.24
The voluntary abandonment of an arbitration before it was com-
22"We do not see how the company's silence for nine months can be construed
as a legal waiver of the right of arbitration... It was as much the duty of one
party as the other to initiate the proceeding unless it may have possibly been more
the duty of the plaintiff as the affirmative party. The company might have been
led to suppose the insured would not press his claims in the fact of the accusation
of fraud..." Smith v. California Insurance Company, 87 Me. 190, 32 AtI. 872,
873 (I895). By his conduct the respondent may have waived his right to object
to the petitioner's delay. New v. Union Automobile Company 137 So. 563, (La.
App. 1931), reuersed on other grounds, 141 So. 416, (La. App. 1932).
""There is nothing in the contract which fixed a time to demand arbitration,
and whether by delay or custom of the trade there has been a waiver is a question
of law and fact to be determined by the arbitrator." Shechter v. Arbib, N. Y. L. J.,
Sept. 17, 1925.
24Nagy v. Arcas Brass and Iron Company, 242 N. Y. 97, z5o N. E. 614 (1926).
Even the refusal to arbitrate in a foreign jurisdiction may bar. Kroeger v. Colli-
shaw, N. Y. L. J., May i2, 1924. Suppose one side informs the other it denies all
liability and will pay only "if sued". Evans v. Farmers Reliance Insurance
Company, Iio N. J. L. 259, 264 AtI. 258 (1933), seemingly indicates such action
would work a waiver of arbitration rights.
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pleted will likewise have that effect.2 There is a split in authority
over the effect of the previous refusal to arbitrate controversies other
than those for which arbitration is demanded.2 While an accord and
satisfaction should bar arbitration, the attempt to obtain a voluntary
settlement will not.2 7 Surprisingly enough, however, the latter point
has been urged as a defense to a motion to compel arbitration, show-
ing the extremes to which counsel can go to prevent court compulsion
of the proceeding.
A plaintiff's mere threat to bring suit is not sufficient to work a
waiver of his right to arbitration,28 but bringing any actual proceed-
ings works an immediate waiver,2 9 unless they are brought in ignor-
ance of the arbitration clause, and are immediately discontinued when
the latter is discovered. 3 Even the commencement of a provisional
remedy will work a waiver of the arbitration agreement.3 1
Recently the New York courts have developed a doctrine that if a
suit is brought in the absence of knowledge of any arbitrable contro-
versy and discontinued as soon as discovered, the plaintiff .may still
insist upon arbitration. The doctrine, which has a curious history,
was brought about to cure a grave abuse arising out of the decision in
Webster -v. Van Allen, 2 which required that the petitioner in a motion
to compel arbitration must show that a controversy or dispute exists.
nMatter of Levine, N. Y. L. J., June 12, 1930.
2$Such action fatal, see Young v. Crescent Company, 24o N. Y. 244, 148 N. E.
510 (1925). Contra: Matter of Kadner, N. Y. L. J., Sept. I9, 3928.
27Matter of Hill Silk Corporation, N. Y. L. J., March 22, 1928.
28Matter of Farone, N. Y. L. J., Aug. 13, 1925.
2""Nothing could be more inconsistent with the demand for arbitration than
the institution and maintenance of an action." Matter of Bostwick, N. Y. L. J.,
March 3, 1926. Though of course the defendant in the action has not waived
anything. One plaintiff who brought an action in violation of an arbitration
clause, tried to argue that by doing so both sides were barred from claiming arbi-
tration. Ely v. Lloyd, et al., N. Y. L. J., Oct. 31, 1930. The case while not
important indicates the attitude some members of the bar assume towards the
arbitration law. Quaere, if the rules regarding waiver are different when the
arbitration clause specifically provides arbitration is only a condition precedent
to a suit. See Samuels v. Samis, 124 Misc. 35,207 N. Y. Supp. 249 (1923). Most
modern arbitration clauses are not so drawn.
"Matter of Weinberg, N. Y. L. J., March i9, 1928.
3 1Young v. Crescent Company, 24o N. Y. 244, 148 N. E. 5io (X925). But see
Lehay Inc. v". Pathe Exchange, 237 App. Div. 468, 263, N. Y. Supp. 495 (4th
Dept. 1933). For recent decisions on the effects of arbitration on mechanics liens
see Park Lane Properties, Inc. v. Fisher, 89 Colo. 593, 5 P.'(2d) 577 (193i);
Askovitz v. Gabay, 229 App. Div. 258, 241 N. Y. Supp. 394 (2nd. Dept. I93O);
Brescia Const. Co. Inc., v. Walart Const. Co. Inc., 238 App. Div. 36o, 264 N. Y.
Supp. 862, (ist Dept. 1933).
32217 App. Div. 219,216 N. Y. Supp. 552 (4th Dept. 1926).
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If the respondent admits that the petitioner is right in his contention,
as for example that the debt claimed is due but the respondent will
not pay because of a counterclaim, the plaintiff cannot obtain judg-
ment by means of a speedy arbitration but must wait his turn in the
courts. Suffice it to say that Webster v. Van Allen furnished to
defendants who- had a contract containing an arbitration clause, a
real opportunity to delay in the payment of just debts. There grew
up a practise of refusing to reply to creditors' demands so that it was
difficult to* procure evidence of a controversy and thereby compel
arbitration. On the other hand, if the plaintiff started suit the
defendant would procure a stay of the action after several months
had gone by, and it was believed could effectively stop any efforts of
the plaintiff to procure arbitration if the motion to stay the action was
not resorted to. In Newburger v. Lubbell 3 a creditor unable to pro-
cure a reply from the alleged debtor, knowing of no controversy
between them, demarided a declaratory judgment that no controversy
existed between them and that the defendant be ordered to pay the
balance claimed due, or in the alternative if a controversy existed,
that arbitration be directed to proceed in accordance with the con-
tract. The court, per Cardozo, C. J., in sustaining the lower court's
refusal to grant the declaratory judgment outlined the method which
a plaintiff could pursue, and, it is hoped, eliminated the dilatory
tactics made possible by Webster v. Van Allen saying:
"The plaintiffs may sue at law and reduce their claim to judgment.
If the defendant does not contest the debt, they will have judg-
ment bydefault. On the other hand, if he does contest.. .with the
result.that a controversy develops, they will be free to discontinue
and get the benefit of the contract that whatever controversy
arises shall be settled by arbitration. We see no force in the
objection that a waiver ... of arbitration could be inferred from
the mere commencement of an action in the absence of notice
that a controversy existed ... The plaintiffs are not restricted,
however, to an action at law. If the defendant fails to pay the
debt and refuses to declare himself as to the reason for the failure
leaving the plaintiffs uncertain whether he contests it or not, they
may file their petition under Section 3 of the Arbitration Act,
alleging their uncertainties and praying that the defendant be
required to submit to arbitration whatever controversies exist.
If the defendant in response... concedes the debt, the court will not
appoint arbitrators to compose a nonexisting difference or one
not within the scope of the defendant's promise (cases cited),
but the defendant may be estopped.. .from interposing a de-
fense thereafter."
"257 N. Y. 383, 178 N. E. 669 (1931).
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This is a satisfactory solution, doubtless, but the decision does focus
attention on the abuses which this act, aimed to end commercial
litigation, has caused. Whether Webster v. Van Allen, and its resulting
corollary Newburger v. Lubbell will be followed in other Draft Act
states is an open question.34
When a party to a contract containing an arbitration clause is
sued, he must take some steps to insist on his rights and to obtain
arbitration or he too will be considered as waiving his rights thereto,
according the language of the decisions. 5 That his answer to the
plaintiff's action does not set forth the arbitration claim will not
necessarily prove fatal."8 Nevertheless an answer pleading the
"'We submit that Webster v. Van Allen is wrong in principle. The strong dis-
sent of Mr. Justice Taylor in the case correctly sets forth the view to be followed,
see (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 137. In Dayton Rubber Manufacturing Co. v. Groth
Rubber Company, unreported, decided by the District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, May 27, 1931, a decision contra to Webster v. Van Allen
was given, the court saying: "The failure of the defendant to pay a demand is
sufficient evidence of the existence of a controversy." The New York statute
provides for the enforcement of a provision in a contract to settle by arbitration:
"A controversy thereafter arising between the parties to the contract." (Sec. 2,
italics inserted). Arizona, Louisiana, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island
and Wisconsin omit the italicized words and add in their place: "Out of such
contract or out of the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof"; California
and New Jersey omit and add: "Out of the contract or the refusal to perform the
whole or any part thereof"; Connecticut omits and reads: "Out of such contract
or out of the failure or refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof"; New
Hampshire omits and reads: "Out of such contract." This language, except in
New Hampshire, would seem to destroy the argument of the majority in Webster
v. Van Allen that: "It is essential that some genuine controversy exists. . . I
cannot discover in the arbitration law any legislative purpose or intent to furnish
a new method of granting default judgments", and hence it does not seem likely
the decision would be followed in the states above set forth. However, so much
odd arbitration law has been appearing of late, that it will take judicial inter-
pretation of the language to settle finally the above question.
"Nagy v. Arcas Brass and Iron Company, 242 N. Y. 97, 1So N. E. 614 (1926).
"1"The mere interposing an answer, without asserting the right to arbitrate,
does not of itself constitute a waiver. There must be further acts on the part of
the defendants which could be interpreted as an election to submit the contro-
versy to court and waive the contract provisions as to arbitration." Hosiery
Manufacturers Corporation v. Goldston, 238 N. Y4 22, 149 N. E. 779 (1924). Cf.
Zimmerman v. Cohen, 236 N. Y. 15, 139 N. E. 764 (1923). Contra: Fravert v.
Fesler, ii Colo. App. 378, 53 Pac. 288 (1898). The Colorado decision seems pref-
erable. Suppose the contract containing an arbitration clause is set forth in the
answer, but not specifically pleaded, or suppose the plaintiff sets forth the con-
tract containing the arbitration provision in his declaration, is it demurrable?
See Musgrave v. Kastor, N. Y. L. J., April 13, 1928. It seems clear that courts
will not pay any attention to the arbitration clause set forth in the pleadings,
unless their attention is specifically directed towards it by a motion to stay. See
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arbitration clause, while not a defense to the action, is evidence from
which it can be found that no waiver was intended by the defendant.3 7
Merely pleading the arbitration clause will not protect him however.
He must use some diligence in staying the action8 (or bringing the
motion to compel), though it must be admitted that long delays have
been allowed defendants,39 and certain it is that any defendant who is
anxious to obtain a delay is allowed ample opportunity to do so under
the many decisions rendered in New York. The New York rule that
action must be taken by a defendant to a suit within a reasonable
time is obviously open to grave abuses. Even if the lower court finds
that the defendant who waits almost up to the time the case is ready
for trial to make his motion to stay an action, has not acted within a
reasonable time, he may nevertheless appeal that decision, and thus
gain valuable time before either the suit may be continued against
him or an arbitration had! 0
. And even when a stay of the law suit is granted, there is little
guarantee that arbitration will proceed with dispatch, for on granting
a stay the pourt does not order the arbitration to proceed! The usual
order given in New York enjoins the suit "until the arbitration is
Spencer, White and Prentis, Inc. v. 233 East 94th Street Corporation, N. Y. L. J.,
Nov. 10, 1928 (App. Div.). As to the effect of a counterclaim in defendant's
answer, see Hiltl Company, Inc. v. Bishoff, II9 Misc. 572, 197 N. Y. Supp. 617
(1922); Chapman-Kruge Co. v. Jaffe, 263 N. Y. Supp. 737 (App. Div. 2nd Dept.
1933). As to the effect of amending answer to plead arbitration clauses, see
Zawilstd v. Prahl Construction Company (App. Div. 2nd Dept. 1932), AmERiCAN
ARBITRATION SERVICE (1933) P. 321.
37Hosiery Manufacturers Corporation v. Goldston, 238 N. Y. 22, i49 N. E. 779
(1924).
38Matter of Bauer Company v. Anderson Chemical Company, 2o6 App. Div.
423, 2oi N. Y. Supp. 438 (ist Dept. 1923) (wait of three years after action started,
on eve of trial defendant moves for stay of action, motion denied); Joquel v.
Charles Mieg', Cie, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 29, 3931, (delay of almost three years after
action commenced, during which time defendant had participated in examination
of witnesses on depositions in Paris, France, at great expense to the plaintiff in
original action, motion for stay denied, primarily on latter ground rather than on
delay.)
39Some lower court cases adopt the doctrine that a stay on the eve of trial will
be examined more minutely than otherwise to see if reasons, technical or other-
wise, can be found to deny the arbitration, since "The purpose of the arbitration
law is not to aid in the preference of one court over another, but to discourage
litigation", Villa-Real v. Lissauer, N. Y. L. J., June I1, 1931. But cf. Goldstein v.
Schleifer, 2o9 App. Div. 899, 2o5 N. Y. Supp. 399 (2nd. Dept. 3924).
41Matter of Hosiery Manufacturers Corporation v. Goldston, 238 N. Y. 22,
343 N. E. 779 (1924), such a motion is "subject to direct review" on appeal.
Contra: Petition of Jardine, Matheson Company Ltd., ioo Cal. App. 572, 280
Pac. 697 (1929) (rehearing denied, hearing by Supreme Court denied, 28o Pac.
697 (1929)), distinguishing the New York cases on local statutory grounds.
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completed"4' though occasionally a wise order is given enjoining the
suit only if arbitration is entered upon within a named short period.A
And generally after the defendant has obtained the stay the only way
the plaintiff in the stayed action can obtain an arbitration is by forc-
ing an arbitration by compulsory process ! The bad faith of defendants
and the opportunity for mischief provided by the act is shown by the
fact that on many motions to compel arbitration by plaintiffs whose
actions were stayed, the self-same defendants who insisted upon the
arbitration agreement in their effort to obtain the stay, come forward
with excuses why the arbitration should not be compelled. Fortu-
nately the courts will not allow defendants thus to take an incon-
sistent position. The favorite plea that the petitioner has waived his
right to compel arbitration is denied on the ground of estoppel,4' and
defendants have been unable to show that the arbitration agreement
was invalid or the dispute not arbitrable.4 Plaintiffs have often
voluntarily discontinued actions upon defendants complaining that
there should be an arbitration, without a direct motion to stay, only
to find themselves later compelled to move for affirmative compulsion
of arbitration and being met with a defense that the arbitration
agreement is invalid. Estoppel again is used by the courts,45 but that
such playing fast and loose is possible is evidence of the breakdown of
the arbitration law, and the need of amendments in its provisions.
One California case46 decided that the mere pleading of an arbitra-
41See for example Vandeweghe v. Vandeweghe, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 15, 1932.
42In Ring v. Menger, Ring and Weinstein, Inc., N. Y. L. J., Aug. 14, 1925, the
stay was granted, "With leave of plaintiff to move to vacate such stay, if defend-
ant fail to give notice of the appointment of an arbitrator within ten days after
service of this order, or if the arbitration is otherwise unduly delayed." This form
of order is to be commended highly, and is certainly exemplary and should be
followed. And see the excellent decision in Seidman v. Mount Hope Finishing
Company, N. Y. L. J., June 22, 1928: "In view of the fact that it has not de-
manded arbitration, I cannot assume that it will do so, and until it has taken some
affirmative action to do so, this motion is premature", but note that the defendant
was aforeign corporation against whom attachment had been had in New York, the
defendant not answering the action, and part of the relief asked for was the disso-
lution of the attachment as well as staying the action.
4'Kraus Bros. Lumber Company v. Louis Bossert and Sons, Inc., 62 F. (2d.)
ioo4 (C. C. A. 2d. 1933), which considers the answer of the defendant pleading an
arbitration agreement, as an offer to arbitrate, which, when accepted by the
plaintiff, becomes binding on the defendant.
44Cf. Matter of Kraus Lumber Company, decided by the District Court for
the Eastern District of New York, September 17, I93 I , unreported. See (193I)
AMERICAN ARBITRATION SERVICE, No. 6, p. 99.
15Matter of Dai-Ichi Raw Silk Corporation, N. Y. L. J., Jan. I6, 1931.
4'Palmer v. Fix, 104 Cal. App. 562, 286 Pac. 498 (1930). The point was a dic-
tum, and the decision was not well considered.
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tion agreement by a defendant was not sufficient, and that the
defeidant must take immediate active steps in order to avail himself
of the benefits of an arbitration clause. The decision is good as far
as it goes, but the word "immediate" is still open to judicial construc-
tion. Popkin proposes:
"The better rule would be to require the defendant to move
for arbitration before answering or at least to assert his right
to arbitration in the answer. In that way the plaintiff would
not go to the trouble and expense of continuing the action at
law, only to be confronted long after with a stay of further
proceedings on his part."47
This too falls short of achieving simple justice. A defendant should
not be allowed to answer at all; he should be able to obtain his stay
only by moving, before answering, to compel arbitration in the same
court where the action was brought, if such court possesses equity
jurisdiction, or if not, in a higher court. His motion should be enter-
tained only if he has taken no steps at any time inconsistent with his
claim for arbitration and is willing and ready to proceed thereto.
Otherwise his rights to arbitration should be lost. Two Acts
provide that only one specific court may grant the enforcement of
arbitration agreements. 48 This should be so changed that any court
possessing equity jurisdiction should be able to grant the order and
the entire matter could be cleaned up in the court where the action is
brought. If the defendant is sincere in his desire to obtain arbitra-
tion, he should ask for it for its own sake immediately after suit, other-
wise he should not have it,-wanting it as he generally does only for
delay and its nuisance value.
The language of the British Arbitration Act is, on this point, excel-
lent. The Court is given the discretionary power to stay the action
IF: (i) the party making the motion has not delivered "any plead-
ings or taken any other steps in the proceedings" (except the filing of
an appearance) and (2) the court be "satisfied that there is no suffi-
cient reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with
the submission, and that the applicant was, at the time when the
proceedings were commenced, and still remains ready and willing
470p. cit. supra note 2, p. 339.
'
8In New York: "The Supreme Court or judge thereof"; in New Jersey: "Any
justice of the Supreme Court or judge of a Circuit Court, holding court for any
county where either party resides", has jurisdiction to stay the action; in the
remainder of jurisdictions the court in which the suit or proceeding is pending
shall act. Cf. Kipp v. Hamburg-American Line, 134 Misc. 481, 235 N. Y. Supp.
45o (1929), af'd. 288 App. Div. 802, 239 N. Y. Supp. 914 (Ist. Dept. 193o) and
Chapman-Kruge Company v. Jaffe, 263 N. Y. Supp. 737 (2nd. Dept. 1933).
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to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration." 4'
But the American advocates of commercial arbitration desired no
discretion in the court; they desired arbitration at all events; and in
their earnest zeal for a worthwhile proceeding they have passed an
oppressive and unwise law, not tended to increase the popularity of
arbitration, overlooking the British Arbitration Act, which by its
more moderate and -well-considered provision has made arbitration
the popular worthwhile method of settling commercial c6ntroversies
it is in the British Isles.
The arbitration statutes in many of the states adopting the Draft
State Act declare that the stay shall be granted "provided that the
applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitra-
tion,"5 which would seem to indicate that the New York rules regard-
ing waiver and laches would be adopted by the courts of these states.
In Connecticut and Massachusetts 1 the stay will be granted if the
applicant for the stay is "ready and willing" to proceed with the
arbitration. Under this language it is possible for a defendant who
has been guilty of all kinds of delay and laches to obtain an order stay-
ing the trial providing he shows his readiness and willingness then to
proceed with arbitration. Note also the anomalous provision in
Massachusetts allowing either plaintiff or defendant to obtain the
stay, while in Connecticut any party to an arbitration agreement may
obtain the stay12 Thus in a tri-partite agreement it is possible to
have a suit stayed by one not a party to the action. The sponsors of
the arbitration acts certainly have furnished the material for complica-
tions.
THE UNITED STATES ARBITRATION ACT AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Before examining the further complications raised in interstate
problems, let us examine, however, the jurisdictional questions
raised by the United States Arbitration Act. The United States
Arbitration Act is limited to the enforcement of:
"A written provision in any maritime transaction3 or a con-
"ARBITRATION ACT, 1889, §4. Cf. The Growth of Arbitration. (1929) 67 LAw
JOURNAL (London) 251.5OAri4zona, California, Louisiana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and the United States.
,"CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §5841; MAss. GEN. LAws (1930) c. 251, §21.
52Supra note 51.
"Note the restrictive definition of "maritime transactions", viz. "Charter
parties, bills of lading of water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage, supplies
furnished vessels, collisions, or any other matters in foreign commerce which if
the subject of the controversy, would be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction."
43 STAT. 883, (1925) 9 U. S. C. §i (1926). Note that this does not cover all
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tract, evidencing a transaction involving commerce5' to settle
by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such con-
tract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or part
thereof, or an agreement ii writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a'contract, transaction,
or refusal."65 -
Actions are-stayed by "the court in which such suit is pending"."
A motion to compel arbitration may be granted by.
"any court of the United States which, save for such agreement,
would have jurisdiction under the judicial code at law, in equity,
or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the
controvery, between the parties.
5 7
It is impossible to gain the benefits of the terms of the United
States Arbitration Act by mere agreement for submission to it.18 The
mere fact that a justiciable federal dispute, for example a patent con-
tr6versy, is made subject to arbitration by the agreement, is not
sufflcient.. 9 While there has been much argument pro and con as to
whether diversity of citizenship* alone was sufficient to come within
the purview of the act, it was generally believed that any dispute
involving interstate commerce would fall within its terms.6° Authors
seem to feel that in order to be friendly to the arbitration process they
must lean over backwards to place any and every arbitration agree-
ment within the terms of the act; which we submit is an unsckund
attitude. Nevertheless, the question seems settled by a recent
possible maritimecommerce: see Poor, op. cit. supra note 4, p. 668; Marine Transit
Corporation v. Dreyfus 284 U. S. 263, 52 Sup. Ct. 166 (1932).
""Commerce" is defined as "Commerce among the several states, or with
foreign nations, etc." 43 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U. S. C. §1 (1926).
'543 STAT. 883 (7925), 9 U. S. C. §2 (1926).
"43 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U. S. C. §3 (1926).
5743 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U. S. C. §4 (1926).
68Thus an agreement that the arbitration should be held "pursuant to the
United States Arbitration Act and judgment on the award entered in the Dis-
trict Court, etc." did not bring the arbitration under the act, where there was no
diversity of citizenship, etc. "The jurisdiction of the District Court cannot be
enlarged by consent or a stipulation that judgment might be entered, etc. The
National Arbitration Act provides for arbitrations in maritime, etc. This suit
does not arise under the laws of the United States wherein a decision depends upon
the construction of the statute." In re Woerner, .31 P. (2d) 283, 284 (C. C. A.
-2d, 1929).
59Zip Manufacturing Co. v. Pep Manufacturing Co., 44 F. (2d) 184 (D. C. Del.
1930).
6oCf. REPORT OF ARBITRATION ComMITTEE OF CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF
NEW YORK STATE (1932) p. 2; Cohen and Dayton, op. cit. supra note 4. In fact it
was thought that jurisdiction was coextensive with normal Federal jurisdiction.
But cf. Presserand Baum, op. cit. supra note 4.
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decision'of the Circuit Court of Appeals to the effect that there must
be diversity of citizenship and interstate commerce in order to come
within the terms of the United States Arbitration Act. Jurisdiction
under this Act is not even coextensive with normal federal jurisdic-
tion. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit clearly
defined jurisdiction under the Act when it said:
"A difficulty might arise if jurisdiction depends only upon the
fact that the contract 'involved commerce', i.e. required ship-
ment from one state to another; but the statute does not rest
the courts' power upon that ground. . . The text is entirely clear
that the court must be one'which, save for such agreement, would
have jurisdiction... of the subject matter...' The remedy is not
even coextensive with the jurisdiction;- for instance, the contro-
versy may arise between citizens of diferent states and the con-
tract not 'involve commerce'. A citizen of New Jersey may en-
force arbitration against a citizen of New York upon a contract
which requires him to ship the goods from Newark to Manhattan,
but not upon one where they are to go from Manhattan to the
Bronx. Conversely a citizen of New York may not come to the
District Court to enforce arbitration against another citizen of
that state, though the goods must be shipped across a stateline."1'
It may be noted that this case determines jurisdiction to compel
arbitration, and that it might be argued that the jurisdiction to stay
an action because of an arbitration clause is not thus limited.6 2 If,
however, the courts were to adopt a different ground of jurisdiction
for compelling arbitration from that for staying an action because of
an arbitration agreement, the ridiculous situation would be presented
of a defendant being able to stay an action, and the plaintiff unable
to compel arbitration. The courts should read into the stay of action
section the limitation that it would not be stayed unless they could
similarly compel arbitration. The act should be so clarified that the
jurisdiction in both cases is clearly defined.
6tKraus Brother Lumber Co. v. Bossert, 62 F. (2d) lOO4-O6 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
And note even if the other requirements' are met, judgment will not be entered on
an award under the United States Act unless provision be made therefore in the
arbitration agreement. Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Rust Engineering Co., 59
F. (2d) i038 (App. D. C. 1932). The note in (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 517,
criticizing the decision seems sound.
2See supra notes 55, 56, 57 and the text covering the same. It would seem that
the requisites of the arbitration agreement together with the jurisdictional pro-
visions cited in notes 55 and 56 would make the Kraus limitation apply to staying
of actions. Cf. The Silverbrook, 18 F. (2d) 144 (E. D. La. 1927); Danielson v.
Entre Rios Ry. CO., 22 F. (2d) 326 (D. Md. 1927). But see Presser and Baum, op.
cit. supra note 4, P. 441 ff. "It would be an anomaly if the court could grant such a
stay and could not direct the arbitration to proceed." Marine Transit Corporation
v. Dreyfus, 284 U. S. 263, 274, 52 Sup. Ct. x66, 169 (1932).
212 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
In spite of the passage of the Federal Act, a federal court will not
enforce a state arbitration act. Except for those cases clearly within
the purview of the United States Arbitration Act the law still is that
arbitration agreements will not be specifically enforced by the courts
of the United States. 3 Again there was much argument that since
Congress had shown a new public policy by passing the United States
Arbitration Act, there was no reason for the United States courts to
fail to specifically enforce all arbitration agreements. These courts it
was said had frequently condemned the public policy argument sup-
posed to make for the revocability of arbitration agreements, and had
held them revocable only because of stare decisis.64 Thus ran the
argument, but unfortunately it did not appeal to the federal courts.
In California Prune and Apricot Growers Association v. Catz American
Company65 the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit affirmed
an order of the District Court refusing to enforce specifically an
arbitration agreement under the Draft State Arbitration Act of
California. One argument used by the court was that the state
statute provides specific state courts for its enforcement, and. there-
fore it was not intended for enforcement by a federal court. In Lappe
v. Wilcox66 a Pennsylvanian brought suit against a New York defen-
dant in the Federal District Court in New York in violation of the
provisions of an arbitration clause. The defendant asked that the
action be stayed, on the ground that since New York Arbitration Act
made such arbitration agreements irrevocable the federal court should
therefore stay the action. But the court did no such thing. It held
that the state arbitration act is procedural, not substantive, 7 and
"3Cf. The Atlantan, 252 U. S. 313, 40 Sup. Ct. 332 (I919); Red Cross Line v.
Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109,49 Sup. Ct. 274 (1923); The Howick Hall, io F.
(2d) 162 (E. D. La. 1925); (Note) (1926) IO MINN. L. REV. 415.
"Cf. e. g. United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co.,
222 Fed. ioo6 (S. D. N. Y. 1915). The argument that because a particular type
of arbitration agreement is enforceable, the public policy against all of them is
changed seems fallacious. Otherwise, why did not the statute so provide, at
least for all those within the terms of federal jurisdiction? But cf. Ezell v. Rocky
Mountain Bean and Elevator Co., 76 Colo. 409, 232 Pac. 68o (1925) where a
somewhat similar argument was accepted by the Colorado Supreme Court.
66o F. (2d) 788 (r932). A view opposed to that adopted in the case set forth in
Baum and Pressman, supra note 4, p. 448ff. And see Morris, Specific Performance
in Federal Courts Under State Arbitration Laws (1933) 1 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 245.
"I4 F. (2d) 861 (N. D. N. Y. 1926). The case is commented upon, generally
adversely, in (1927) 1 CIN. L. REV. 222; (1928) 28 CoL. L. REv. 472, 476; (1926)
40 HARV. L. REV. 649; (1926) 36 YALE L.J. 571.
"7It seems well settled law that federal courts are not bound by state arbitration
law. Cf. Atlantic Fruit Company v. Red Cross Line, 276 Fed. 319 (S. D. N. Y.
1921); id. 5 F. (2d) 218 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924); Aktieselskabet Korn-Og, etc. v.
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therefore is not binding on the federal courts. And that was the
main contention of the court in the Prune Growers Case.
THE NATURE OF ARBITRATION ACTS: PROCEDURE OR SUBSTANCE:
ITS EFFECT ON INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT, USE AS AN ESCAPE
FROM ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
In the United States Courts at least, arbitration acts are thus con-
sidered procedural. The New York propagandists of arbitration, who
now so bitterly complain of this doctrine and assert that the acts are
substantive, have themselves and their own courts alone to blame for
this Up to 1920, when New York passed its now famous arbitration
act, it made little difference whether an arbitration act was procedural
or substantive. In 1914 however the New York courts themselves
laid the groundwork for our present law. In Meacham v. Jamestown
etc. Ry.68 two Pennsylvania parties executed a contract in Ohio for
the construction of a railway in Pennsylvania, providing for arbitra-
tion of disputes in connection with the contract. The arbitration
clause was specifically enforceable in Pennsylvania, but the New York
courts allowed a suit to be brought saying that the arbitration provi-
sion was procedural and hence that the lex fori applied. 9 The real
reasoning of the courts seemed to be that these agreements were void
and against public policy in New York and they were not going to
enforce them.70  "Procedural law-lex fori"-the easiest way out.
Rederiaktiebolget, etc., 250 Fed. 935 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918). "Whatever the content,
however, of this arbitration statute of New York State, it could not affect the
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. It is the duty of the Federal Courts to exercise
their powers in every case to which their jurisdiction extends.", Lappe v. Wilcox,
supra note 66, at p. 864.
61211 N. Y. 346, IO5 N. E. 653 (1914), Ann. Cas. 19150 851.
"Accord: Aktieselskabet, etc. v. Rederiaktiebolget, etc., 25o Fed. 935 (C. C. A.
2d, igi8), affd., 252 U. S. 313, 40 Sup. Ct.- 332 (1919). And the rule is true even
where the place of arbitration is designated in the arbitration agreement, and the
law of the place holds such agreements irrevocable. U. S. Asphalt Refining Com-
pany v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 22 Fed. ioo6 (S. D. N. Y., 1915); The Eros,
241 F. 186 (S. D. N. Y., I916), af'd. 251 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); Tatsuuma
Kisen Kabushikd Kaisha v. Prescott, 4 F. (2d) 670 (C C. A. 9th, 1925) holding
the federal courts will not even follow state common law rules regarding revoca-
ability of arbitration agreements.
70
"If the judgment of the court below is to stand, jurisdiction over contro-
versies arising under such contract may be withdrawn from our courts and the
litigation submitted to arbitrators in distant states. The presence of the parties
here, the ownership of property in this jurisdiction, these and other circumstances
may make resort to our courts here essential to the ascertainment of justice. If
jurisdiction is to be ousted by contract, we must submit to the failure of justice
that may result from these and like causes. It is true that some judges have ex-
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In 1921 after New York had passed its Act, its constitutionality was
attacked. The proponents of the Act saw an easy avenue of escape
in "procedure, not substance" and besides if it were a procedural act,
it would apply even to contracts entered into prior to its passage
which was the fact in the case at bar. Enforcement at all costs was
their motto.
The Court of Appeals makes a strong argument for its position
when it said:
"The common-law limitation upon the enforcement of prom-
ises to arbitrate'is a part of the law of remedies. [cases cited]
The rule to be applied is the rule of the forum. Both in this court
and elsewhere,the law has been so declared. Arbitration is a form of
procedure whereby differences may be settled. It is not defini-
tion of the rights and wrongs out of which differences grow. This
statute did not attach a new obligation to sales already made.
It vindicated by a new method the obligation then existing.' 17
Heilman has examined in great detail all the arguments pro and con
and sets forth the cases in such detail that we will not further examine
the law on the subject.7 2 He answers the New York courts thus:
"'lex fori' should not apply to arbitration cases. It is believed
that this rule should be confined to questions of procedure aris-
ing in relation to the machinery of litigation ... If in a given
case a particular court has to decide whether or not to hold an
arbitration stipulation valid and binding.. .,the question, being
one of legal consequences of the stipulation, should be treated
as substantive from the standpoint of conflicts of law." (p. 620.)
The English, on the other hand, consider the enforcement of an
arbitration clause a matter of the enforcement of a contractual term,
a matter of substantive law to be determined by the place of perform-
ance. 73 They foresaw long ago that to hold otherwise would mean
pressed the belief that parties ought to be free to contract about such matters as
they please. In this state the law has long been settled to the contrary. [cases
cited] If jurisdiction of our courts is established by law, it is not to be diminished,
any morethan itis to be increased, by theagreement of theparties.", per Cardozo,
J., P. 354.
7
'Berkovitz, et al. v. Arbib and Houlberg Inc., 23o N.Y. 261, 270, 13o N. E. 288,
289-90 (1921).
72Heilman, Arbitration Agreements and the Conflicts of Laws (1929) 38 YALE L. J.
617. See also Corbin, Conditional Rights and Functions of an Arbitrator (1928)
LAW QUARTERLY REV. 24. Cf. Delimitation of "Procedure" in the Conflict of
Laws (1933) 47 HARv. L. R., 315, 318 et seg.
73Hamlyn and Co. v. Talisher Distillery, (1894) A. C. 202; Spurrier v. LaCloche,
(i9o2) A. C. 446. In the Hamlyn Case, Lord Watson, while admitting that lex
fori applied to matters of procedure and proof said: "But all the rules... refer
to the action of the court in investigating the merits of a suit in which its jurisdic-
tion has already been established." (p. 2 3).
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that if a party with a clause valid in state A could somehow or other
find a defendant in B, a state not enforcing arbitration agreements,
or obtain jurisdiction hi the federal courts (and not fall under the
jurisdiction of the United States Act), an arbitration could easily be
defeated.74 Sturges foresaw the difficulty, and suggested as a possible
way out that the federal courts should stay the action in conformity
with the state arbitration act; and it seems an amendment to the
United States Arbitration Act is desirableTh But due to our law
being as it is, it seems that any ruse to obtain jurisdiction in a federal
court or in a non-enforcing state can defeat the carefully &awn
arbitration laws which mean to specifically enforce all arbitration
agreements. Regardless of theoretical arguments pro and con, it is
simply another instance of courts applying the lex fori any chance
they obtain, and the "remedial statute" offers an easy "talky-talk"
7"I am not prepared to affirm a rule which does not appear to me to be recom-
mended by any consideration of principle or expediency. One result of its adop-
tion would be that if two persons domiciled in England made a contract there
containing the same clause of reference which occurs in this case, either of them
could avoid the reference by bringing an action before a Scotch court, if the other
happened to be temporarily resident in Scotland, or to have personal estate in that
country capable of being arrested." Hamlyn v. Talisher Distillery, (1894) A. C.
202, 214, per Lord Watson.
76"Unless ... Lappe v. Wilcox prevails it seems plausible to urge that the Con-
formity Act may be invoked to require the stay of trial according to the state
statute. That statute provides as follows: 'The practise, pleading and modes of
proceeding in civil cases, other than equity and admiralty causes, in the district
courts, shall conform, as near as may be, to the practise, pleadings and forms and
modes of proceeding existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the
State within which such district courts are held, and rule of court to the contrary
notwithstanding.' U. S. Rev. St. §914, 28 U. S. C. A. §724. The application of
this statute, in such cases, could be made without prejudice to the general pinciple
that state statutes will not be recognized to enlarge or restrict the jurisdiction of
the federal courts ... The exception in the Conformity Act, excluding 'equity
causes', offers little encouragement to suppose that the act will be applied as con-
cerns the remedies for specific enforcement of the arbitration agreement." STUR-
GES, ARBITRATIONS AND AwARDs (1931) p. 937. (sed quaere if staying an action is
not assisting equity jurisdiction.) The only satisfactory solution, unless we ob-
tain a decision of the Supreme Court, is for the United States Arbitration Act to
be amended to provide that the federal courts may enforce a state arbitration act;
assuming of course that public policy does not dictate an easy escape from arbitra-
tion agreements. We personally are opposed to the mandatory enforcement of
every arbitration agreement (see our Paradox in Arbitration Law, supra note 7);
and feel that the evasive process herein outlined is simply another avenue utilized
to escape the rigors of a law, theoretically sound perhaps, but certainly psycho-
logically impossible of achieving its object. The recently developed trick used by
New York counsel of bringing an action in tort instead of contract in order to
defeat arbitration clauses is but another example of this evasive process. See
supra note 16.
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escape.78 And it seems logical enough on second thought that the
courts of one state should not want to enforce arbitration agreements
in a new and novel way, against all their well-established law, merely
because the legislatures of some other states at the besieging of cer-
tain types of business interests have declared arbitration agreements
irrevocable. 7
Very recently the Court of Chancery of Delaware refused to stay an
action brought there against a Delaware corporation by a New York
plaintiff, in violation of an arbitration agreement.78 It developed
that in this case the arbitration had already been proceeding in New
York for three years, that $75o,ooo had been spent in conducting the
arbitration, which would be entirely lost if the suit continued; but
to no avail. The court rested on the Meacham and Berkovitz cases
and refused to stay the suit. Had the contract provided specifically
for arbitration in New York, the result would have been the same.7
The federal court's decision in Lappe v. Wilcox does not stand alone;
its logic seems to appeal to our state courts as well.
REMOVAL OF ARBITRATION ACTIONS TO FEDERAL COURTS
Whether a motion to specifically enforce arbitration may be re-
moved to a federal court on the ground of dversity of citizenship,
assuming the required amount involved, has proven the cause of much
difficulty. The problems raised are far without the scope of this
76And note that even in the English cases above set forth, these cases were
enforcing lex fori of England. The arbitration agreement in each case provided
for English arbitration (according to the English court) and hence a decision of
the Scotch court and the Isle of Wight court refusing to apply the English arbitra-
tion law was reversed.
7"Thus Lord Watson, admitted in Hamiyn and Co. v. Talisher Distillery, et. al.,
(1894) A. C. 202, that if arbitration agreements were never enforced in the forum.
that lex fori would apply.
78Vitaphone Corporation v. Electrical Research Corporation, 166 Atl. 255 (Del.
Ch. 1933). See also 167 Atl. 845 ( Del. Ch. 1933) refusing to modify original de-
cision. In addition to the usual substantive argument presented, counsel for
the applicant for the stay tried to argue that Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281
U. S. 397, 50 Sup. Ct. 338 (193o) and Brandford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286
U. S. 145, 52 Sup. Ct. 57I (1932) made the enforcement of the New York statute
compulsory on the Delaware court. It would have seemed that in view of the
irreparable loss to the parties were the arbitration not held, that the court on gdn-
eral equity jurisdiction might have enjoined the action. This view is well argued
in a note on the principal case (1933) 47 HARV. L. REV. 126, and contra 33 COL.
L. REv. 144o; both reviews disapproving the case, however. But the prejudice
against specific enforcement of arbitration agreements is so deep-seated, that the
ultimate decision of the court really was to be expected.
7"See the cases cited supra note 69.
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paper.80 Suffice it to say that a motion to compel arbitration under a
state act was not removable to the federal courts even though the
matter involved a "maritime dispute","' nor was a motion to remove
because of diversity of citizenship with the proper amount in contro-
versy. s2 It almost seems that the law is such as to encourage parties
from different jurisdictions who have contracts containing arbitration
clauses to attempt all the jurisdictional tricks to stage the litigation
in a state which will or will not compel arbitration or stay the action,
according to their desires. That such a situation is undesirable is
obvious.
ENJOINING FOREIGN SUITS BECAUSE OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
The normal arbitration agreement does not provide for its enforce-
ment under any particular law. Even if it did provide, however, for
arbitration in accordance with'the laws of a particular state, or under
the arbitration law of a particular state, it is believed that such a
clause would be disregarded under the lex fori doctrine previously
advanced.8' On the other hand, suppose an arbitration clause pro-
vides for arbitration according to the law of New York and one party
starts suit in Delaware, where, as we have already seen, the Delaware
Courts will not decline the action. It is possible, in such a case, how-
ever, that if the courts of New York obtain jurisdiction over the
parties, they might enjoin the bringing or continuing of the action in
Delaware. In Pennsylvania Copper Mines Ltd. v. Rio Tinto Co. Ltd.8
a Spanish-made contract between English firms provided for arbitra-
tion and in addition that the contract should be construed according
to the laws of England. In granting ah injunction against a suit
brought in Spain, Fletcher Moulton, L. J. said:
"In the present case by bringing an action in the Spanish court,
the Rio Tinto Co. are depriving the Pennsylvania Company, the
"
0The problem is excellently and fully set forth in STURGES, COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS (1931), C. 17, §480, p. 937-945, wherein the abuses and
peculiar doctrines of the law are explained.
8 Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 1o9, 44 Sup. Ct. 274 (1924).
Other phases of the case may be found in 233 N. Y. 373, 135 N. E. 821 (1922)
(which decision was reversed by the Supreme Court); 277 Fed. 853 (S. D. N. Y.,
1921).
82Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Manufacturing Co., 7 F. (2d) 5II (S. D. N. Y.,
1925); id., i i F. (2d) 368 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926); id., 29 F. (2d) 40 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928);
cf. (Note) (1929) 42 HARV. L. Rzv. 8O; Baum and Pressman, supra note 4, P.
253ff.
83Cf. for example, the cases supra note 69; Shaeffer v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
36 Ohio App. 31, 172 N. E. 689 (193o); and the discussion in the text pp. 213-214.
8'105 T. L. R. 846 (1912).
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. plaintiffs in the present action, of the right to apply to our courts
to prevent this dispute from being decided in any other way than
by arbitration. Therefore, we ought to'exercise our powers in
personam to prevent that line of conduct taking effect which is
certainly contrary to their contractural duties.""5
Unless the courts of the state which enforce' an arbitration clause
enjoins the suit in another state, it is unsafe to commence an arbitra-
tion in the first state without an order directing arbitration to pro-
ceed, unless one wants to risk the consequences of the recent Dela-
ware decision, with its concomitant loss and delay. And quaere if the
Delaware courts would have to respect such an order?8 Obviously a
defendant, if in New York, would have to do so. On the other hand,
to commence an arbitration by a court order means a vanishing of the
voluntary and friendly nature of arbitration, and a spirit of litigation
prevails. It is just the sort of thing to wound the pride of the com-
pelled party and to cause him to take such steps as the commence-
ment of an action in a non-enforcing state. The matter is indeed
puzzling, and does present almost unsurmountable difficulties unless
we have a uniform arbitration law in all states, or unless all states Win
agree that lex contractus governs.
ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION IN JURISDICTION OTHER THAN FoRUm
Suppose that a contract provides that arbitration is to be had in
Delaware and an attempt is made to enforce it in New York, or
another state having the modern Draft State Act. The New Jersey
courts would directly order arbitration in a foreign jurisdiction,8 7
Pennsylvania has refused to pass on the question by subtle evasions,"
while New York declined to order an arbitration directly in a foreign
jurisdiction."a Under the United States Arbitration Act, arbitration
8Id., at page 852.
$Tf. Miller v. Gittings, 85 Md. 6oi, 37 Atl. 372 (1897); Philadelphia Company
v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 6o5, 32 Sup. Ct. 340 (1912); Royal League v. Kavanaugh,
233 Ill. 175, 84 N. E. 178 (I9o8); Kempson v. Kempson, 58 N. E. Eq. 94, 43 Atl.
97 (1899). See (1912) 26 HARV. L. REV. 292.
87"There can be no question but what the court has jurisdiction to do this if the
parties have so agreed because the act reads: 'shall. . order ... arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the agreement.'" In re California Lima Bean Growers
Association, 9 N. J. Misc. 362, 364, 154 Atl. 532, 533 (931).
s8Katakura & Co. Ltd. v. Vogue Silk Hosiery Co., 307 Pa. 544, I61 Atl. 529
(1932), note (1933) 7 TEMP. L. Q. 512, refusing to comment on the lower court de-
cisionid nomine, 15 D.& C. 389 (931) ordering arbitration in New York.
ssa Matter of Inter-ocean Food Products Inc., 2o6 App. Div. 426, 2O N.Y.
Supp. 536 (ist Dept. 1923); Matter of California Packing Corporation, 121 Misc.
212, 2O N. Y. Supp. I58 (1923). The Court of Appeals refused to pass on the
question. Apiritusfabriek Astra v. Sugar Products Co., 23o N. Y. 261, 13o N. E.
288 (1921). The Inter-Ocean case is approved in (1924) 24 CoL. L. REV. 204.
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can be ordered only within the district wherein the order is made,8'
while under the California Act an arbitration shall be held in Cali-
fornia, unless the parties have agreed in writing after the dispute
arises that it shall be held outside the state. 0 There are dicta to the
effect that an arbitration ordered in another jurisdictibn would have
to be conducted according to the laws of the state which orders it."1
As a matter of fact, courts which enforce arbitration agreements, if
possible, will order the arbitration to take place within their own
jurisdictions, either on a forced construction of the contract,92 or by
plainly disregarding it by saying that since they cannot order the
arbitration to take place abroad, they must do the next best thing by
ordering it to take place within its own jurisdiction.13 This in the
ordinary case seems bad, inasmuch as the locale of an arbitration
may be more important than the arbitration itself.
Nevertheless, there has been little attempt to compel arbitration
abroad. The older generation of lawyers seems to cling to too rigid
views on the jurisdiction of equity to have attempted it. But there
have been many efforts to stay a suit in state A when a contract
provides for arbitration in state B. The New York courts, pointing
out that to stay an action in New York is entirely different to enforc-
ing the arbitration to proceed abroad, uniformly grant the order for
the stay.4 On the other hand, there is no uniformity of decision in
8'43 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U. S. C. §4 (1926).
'
0 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1931) §1286. The Statute applies: "Except
in contracts that fall within the scope of the United States Arbitration Act."
Does this mean that if a contract comes within the scope of the United States
Arbitration Act that arbitration can be ordered in another state, thus giving the
California courts powers greater than possessed by the federal courts under the
Act or does it mean that the California courts cannot act on them at all?
"lMatter of Hedworth, Fletcher & Co. Line, N. Y. L. J., April 6, 1923. Colli-
shaw v. IKroeger, 211 App. Div. 809,206 N. Y. Supp. 8o2 (2nd Dept. 1924).
"Cf. Katakura & Co. Ltd. v. Vogue Silk Hosiery Co., 307 Pa. 544, i61 Atl. 529
(1932). Cf. Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Company, 252 N. Y. 284, 169 N. E.
386 (1929).
'
3Matterof Nozaki Bros., Inc., N.Y. L. J., Aug. 5, 1921. Cf. Matter of Howard
P. Foley Co., Inc., N. Y. L. J., Oct. 26, 1928. But see also Direct United States
Cable Co. v. Dominion Telegraph Company, 84 N. Y. 153 (188x).
'
4 Cases supra note 88a. "To decline to hear a case... is very different from
ordering the parties to proceed to a foreign jurisdiction in order to arbitrate their
differences before a foreign tribunal... The general trend of authority, it seems to
me, is that no court will willingly relinquish its jurisdiction over controversies
arising between those who are amenable to its jurisdiction, nor will any sovereign
order its citizens or subjects to go before the tribunals of another sovereign and
submit to its jurisdiction, that their differences may be adjudicated." Matter of
Inter-Ocean Food Products Inc., 2o6 App. Div. 426, 21o N. Y. Supp. 53o (ist
Dept. 1923). But compare the anomalous, but well thought out'and excellent
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the federal courts. The Silverbrook" refused to stay an action brought
in violation, of an arbitration clause providing for arbitration in
England. The court thought that since it had no jurisdiction under
the federal act to order arbitration abroad, it would be unfair for it
to stay the action, it being unable to supervise the proceedings
abroad or act on the award. Danielsen v. Entre Rios Railroad Com-
pany" on the other hand did stay the action under similar circum-
stances, arguing that The Silverbrook was erroneous:
"The language of these sections makes it evident that the intent
of Congress was to change the existing rule and make contracts
arbitration effectual... The Silverbrook... seems erroneous
under the broad language of Section 3 ... There is nothing in the
act which indicates that, although the arbitration provided for
may be beyond the jurisdiction of the court, this should forestall
or in any way curtail jurisdiction ... On the contrary, as is seen
from the language of the sections of the act above quoted, it is
contemplated that the proceedings may be brought in the usual
manner and jurisdiction over the arbitration assumed if the
arbitration provided for is to take place within the court's juris-
diction; if not, then the proceedings shall be stayed until the
foreign arbitration is perfected, whereupon the court has power
to enter a decree upon the award." (Pp. 327, 328.)
The Fredensboro97 is often cited as being in accord with The Silver-
brook, but an inspection of its decree shows that the court's decision
was very limited.98 Judge Mack has pointed out the unfairness in the
Silverbrook decision:
"Nor should it be overlooked that an unfortunate situation is
created if arbitration agreements can be repudiated in American
decision in Seidman v. Mount Hope Finishing Co., N. Y. L. J., June 22, 1928,
where a foreign defendant, upon whom attachment had been had, does not appear
in the action brought against it, or answer, and then moves to stay the action
until arbitration can be had in accordance with the contract: "In view of the fact
that it has not demanded arbitration, I cannot assume that it will do so, and until
it has taken-some-affirmative action to do so, this motion is premature."
g118 F. (2d) 144 (E. D. La., 1927); (1927) 36'YMAE L. J. ioi6; accord: The
Breechrood, 35 F. (2d) 41 (S. D. N. Y., 1929).
"'22 F. (2d) 326 (D. C. Md., 1927). The case is approved in (1928) 41 HARv. L.
REv. 664.
9718 F. (2d) 983 (E. D. La., 1927).
98
"It is apparent, therefore, that the agreement to arbitrate contained in the
charter party does not oust the jurisdiction of the court. In view of the fact that
the res is within the jurisdiction of the court, that the witnesses are within the
jurisdiction, that either party may avail itself in the suit of the arbitration clause
in accordance with the United States Arbitration Act, I fail to see any sound
reason why the court should not take jurisdiction." The Fredensboro, supra note
97, at page 985.
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courts while American citizens can insist upon their enforcement
in their favor as a bar to litigation abroad." 99
On the other hand, in spite of an alleged criticism of confusion in the
decision of The Silverbrook00 there is much force to the argument that
the court cannot compel arbitration abroad and therefore should not
stay the action. Suppose an agreement to arbitrate in Delaware.
The Delaware plaintiff cannot obtain jurisdiction in Delaware over
a New York defendant, knows an arbitration in New York will prove
abortive and hence sues the defendant in New York. The New York
defendant stays the suit, and eats his cake and has it too, while the
Delaware plaintiff is powerless, either to sue or obtain an arbitration.
Staying an action for an arbitration to be held abroad or in another
state brings forward all the vices above set forth with regard to
staying an action in connection with a local arbitration, in addition to
which there is often no way, even by compulsory process to obtain
justice. If an action is stayed because of an agreement providing for
an arbitration in another jurisdiction, the party staying the action
should be required to post a bond conditioned on his carrying out the
foreign arbitration,' or better still, an order providing that unless
the foreign arbitration be held within a reasonable time the suit
might be continued. And we would require the stay action to be
brought with, all the requirements mentioned above for a "local"
arbitration.
The citizen of a state which has the modem arbitration act is in
some ways handicapped if he provides for an arbitration within that
state in his contracts with a party from another jurisdiction not
having it. Under normal circumstances he cannot -compel arbitration
against the non-resident and the non-resident can compel it against
him. Generally his only remedy is to sue in the foreign jurisdiction.
The Ohio Arbitration Act attempts to remedy the situation and
provides that a provision in an arbitration agreement to hold the
arbitration in a particular county of Ohio confers irrevocable jurisdic-
tion on the courts of that county to order arbitration to proceed. 0 2
9 Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 Fed. 319, 322 (S. D. N. Y., 1921);
see also Baum and Presser, supra note 4, page i. But cf. Marine Transit Cor-
poration v. Dreyfus, supra note 62.
1 0 For example see (Note) (1927) 36 YALE L. J. ioI6, arguing that the New York
rule should be followed, says of The Silverbrook, supra note 95: "In the instant
case, specific performance of the agreement was not sought, there being only a
motion to stay the proceedings, and the court appears to have been misled in basing
its decision on its assumed inability to direct arbitration."
'
0lCf. Kirchner v. Gruban (igog) i Ch. 413; Interstate Silk Corporation v.
M. Salzberg & Sons, Inc., N. Y. L-J., April 14, 1933.
0IOno GEN. CODE (Page, 1932) §§12148-8. Cf. Sturges and Burn Manufac-
turing Co. v. Unit Construction Co., 207 Ill. App. 74 (1917).
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This particular provision cures the difficulty above set forth; but
presents certain evils in connection with surreptitiously inserted
arbitration provisions in standardized contracts. It can be used as an
instrument of hardship and oppression.'01
ARBITRATIONs HELD EX PARTE
It was generally thought that a statute making arbitration agree-
ments irrevocable would allow arbitrators appointed to proceed
ex parte in the event one side proved recalcitrant. This would of
course provide a remedy in the extra-territorial cases where service
of process for an order to compel was impossible, for no court order
would be necessary. Unfortunately the New York Court of Appeals
intimated that an ex parte arbitration could not be held and without
a court order a party with an arbitration clause is powerless to pro-
ceed, unless the other side consents.'0 This decision surprised the
bar, and completely astonished the British Court of Appeals, but was
followed in their interpretation of the New York Act.' The New
York Act has since been amended and provides that an ex-pare
arbitration may now be held. 0 , So that if our New York busi-
ness man has a contract providing for arbitration with a Delaware
customer, and the latter proves recalcitrant, the New Yorker can
hold his arbitration ex parte, providing he does not need collateral
enforcement by the New York courts for the appointment of arbitra-
tors; which like a motion to compel requires personal service within
the jurisdiction. Whether the statutes of the other states having the
Draft Act would need amendment to provide for an ex parte arbitration
is still an open question. 0 7
103See Phillips, supra note 7, 1275 ff.
10Bullard v. Morgan H. Grace & Co., 24o N. Y. 388, 148 N. E. 559 (1925).
"'5See Bankers and Shippers Insurance Co. v. Liverpool Insurance Co., 24
Lloyd's List Reports (1925). The argument against the Bullard decision is that
the statute makes an arbitration agreement irrevocable, which confers irrevocable
authority on the arbitrators and hence they can proceed ex parte. See In re
Smith etc., 25 Q. B. D. 545 (890). Cf. State ex rel. Fancher v. Everett, I44
Wash. 592, 258 Pac. 486 (1927).
:°6ARBITRATION LAW §4a, added by LAWS 1927, c. 352. The constitutionality
of the act, when applied to a contract, both parties to which were residents of
New York, the contract and arbitration to be performed entirely in New York,
has been sustained. Finsilver, Still and Moss v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., 253 N. Y.
382, 171 N. E. 579 (1930), reversing 227 App. Div. 90, 237 N. Y. Supp. oo (ist
Dept. 1929), noted (1930) 43 HAxv. L. RaV. 824.
'
07When other arbitration decisions regarding the Draft State Act have occurred
in states outside of New York, the New York decisions have been followed. But
ef. Stiringer v. Toy, 33 W Va. 86, io S. E. 26 (1889); State ex rel. Fancher v.
Everett, 144 Wash. 592, 258 Pac. 486 (1927) which are contra to Bullard v. Mor-
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It seems doubtful whether an ex parte arbitration should be had
against a non-resident unless the contract specifically provided the
state wherein the arbitration could be had.108 If arbitration is re-
medial only, and does not pertain to substance, that would allow the
law of the forum to govern, but it does not seem quite fair or legal for
the lexfori to govern unless there has been some consent to its juris-
diction in the first place. Lex contractus is fairer; but there is no law
to that effect as shown before. If a provision for arbitration which
mentions no venue for the arbitration would allow an arbitration to be
conducted ex parte in any state permitting them, we might have the
ridiculous situation of a contract made in Connecticut between a
resident of Massachusetts and one of New York, providing for arbi-
tration but not naming the locus. Therefore, each state allows ex
parte arbitrations, so neither party is willing to come to the other
state, and each holds an ex parte arbitration in his state, obtains an
award against the other and comes to the other's jurisdiction to en-
gan H. Grace & Co., supra note 104. In Connecticut and Massachusetts specific
provision is made for the ex parte arbitrations. CONN. GEN. STAT. (r930) §5846;
MASS. GEN. LAWS C. 251, §§6, 18. Under IowA CODE (1927) §12701, MicH.
COMP. LAWS (1927) §15416, MINN. STAT. (1927) §9513 and under the ComIs-
SIONERS ACT §7 in force in Nevada, North Carolina, Utah and Wyoming, ex
parte arbitrations can be held. This, of course, applies only to agreements to
arbitrate an existing dispute, and provisions to arbitrate a future dispute arising
out of a contract are clearly not thus enforceable. Cf. Curtis, Comparison
of Recent Arbitration Statutes (1927) 13 Am. BAR Assoc. J. 567.
108But see: "The order it is said is void because the parties in agreeing to arbi-
trate their differences had in view an arbitration in Massachusetts, and not
performance somewhere else. Whether this was their meaning was, however, a
question of construction, to be determined by the judge receiving the petition.
Jurisdiction was not dependent on his determining it correctly. We must dis-
tinguish between the place of performance in respect of manufacture and delivery
and the place of performance for the settlement of differences. The contract was
to be performed in Massachusetts to the extent that the things to be sold were to
be there manufactured and delivered. The conclusion does not follow of necessity
that the remedy prescribed for the settlement of differences was to be sought in
the same forum ... The statute of New York does not bring the contract into
being, but adds a new implement, the remedy of specific performance for its more
effectual performance. The remedy may lawfully be extended to contracts of
manufacture made in Massachusetts and there to be performed, unless it is one
of the terms of the arbitration clause, implied, if not express, that the arbitration
shall proceed in a particular locality... Express restriction there is none in the
contract now before us." Matter of Marchant, 252 N. Y. 294-5, 169 N. E. 368
(1929). We agree with the conclusion of the notewriter in (930) 43 HARV. L.
REv. 809, 81o, that arbitration is enforceable in New York, "unless the contract
by its express terms contemplates arbitration in some other jurisdiction," but
note an ex parte arbitration is not enforcing arbitration, for there is no jurisdiction
over the defendant, gained by service of process.
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force it! And these are the laws to make for simplicity in business
proceedings! Unless the contract specifically provides for an arbi-
tration in a particular jurisdiction, or unless the lex contractus rule
is adopted, and the law, of the state wherein the contract was made,
(or to be performed-we care not which so long as there is some
uniformity about it) is utilized, there should be no allowance of ex
parte arbitrations except where all the parties involved live in one
state and that is the state where the ex parte arbitration is held. But
the earnest advocates of arbitration would not approve of such rules,
"get an arbitration held at all costs" seems to be their motto and the
language quoted in note io8 leads us to suspect that an ex parte
arbitration might be attempted under a general arbitration clause
naming no venue for the proceedings. 09
Sturges has cast some doubt on the application of the lex fori
doctrine heretofore set out. In 193o, before the decisions in many
of the cases set forth herein, he wrote:
"These views, if fairly summarized, manifest considerable
restriction upon the general doctrine ... that questions concern-
ing the revocability and enforceability of an arbitration agree-
ment are matters of remedy to be determined by the local rule of
the forum.""10
At the time this was written we agreed-later cases herein cited have
changed our opinion. He draws his conclusion in the main from
Matter of Marchant"I intimating:
"that if the arbitration clause in such a foreign contract desig-
nates a place for holding arbitrations which is not within the
State of New York, the Court of Appeals is likely to rule that
an order appointing an arbitrator is a nullity ..... " 112
Even then, the lexfori as a procedural matter might apply. The Court
might well mean that since the arbitration cannot be held in New
York, the Court cannot order it abroad or appoint arbitrators on a
narrow view of equity jurisdiction.
Note the facts in the Marchant case. A Maine corporation con-
tracted to sell and deliver tractors to a New York corporation; the
contract was made in Massachusetts, the merchandise to be there
made and delivered, and provided for arbitration without designating
a locus therefor. The New York Court appointed an arbitrator under
the arbitration act. Unless the Court is clearly applying lex fori, it
would never have appointed arbitrators in the case at all. Under lex
102But cf. infra notes 117, I18 and 119 ignfra.
'
1 0STURGES, COMIERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS (1930) 920.
n
tSupra, note io8. 120p. cit. supra, note I10.
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contractus they would not; under the law of the place of performance
they would not; unless the rather illogical view is taken that the
place of performance of the contract is not the place for the per-
formance of the arbitration. Sturges cites one other case, Hudson v.
Estates Coal Company,"' where there was a New York action brought
on a Pennsylvania lease of Pennsylvania properties, and the court
intimated that if the Pennsylvania arbitration statute were pleaded,
it might grant a stay of the action. The case, however, is but a
lower court decision and not at all well-considered. 1 4 And note that
the courts never seem to discuss in the ordinary case of this sort
where the contract was made, or where the parties reside, or where
performance is to take place. Inthe Inter-Ocean Case,"5 the facts show
performance of the main contract was to take place in California; in
the California Packing Case it was not discussed. Yet in both cases,
a suit was enjoined in New York, because of a clause providing for
arbitration in California, at a time when it was impossible to compel
arbitration in California. The decisions left the plaintiff in the action
totally without rights, for unless it could find the New York defendant
in another jurisdiction, it could notcompel arbitration, or sue. That
was applying lex fori with a "vengeance, and since'the same court
admitted that it lacked the power to compel arbitration in another
jurisdiction, while staying an action, since the Court of Appeals
approved the Inter-Ocean decision in the Marchant Case, it would
seem that lexfori procedural law is the real thought of the court, in
spite of nicely spun words given by them. The cases above set forth
comPelling arbitration abroad apply lex fori and the facts when
examined show the contract was not made in the state ordering
arbitration, the performance was not to take place there, and ex
hypothesi the arbitration was not to take place there. We conclude
that the confusion and hardship caused by the many decisions is the
result of applying lexfori in any event, regardless of the excuse for so
doing. The reader may find some help, and likewise some confusion
in the cases construing an agreement to restrict suits under a contract
to a court of a foreign jurisdiction." 6
113132 Misc. 590, 230 N. Y. Supp. 372 (1928). The case is noted in (1929) 29
COL. L. REv. 668.
"
4For example the court assumed that the Pennsylvania Arbitration Act would
apply to the particular contract made in 1898 involved, when by the very terms
of the act a contract, entered into before the passage of the act (1927) was ex-
cluded from its purview. nMSupra note 88a.
U8At early common law, an agreement in a contract to settle disputes in a
foreign court was disregarded by the courts; and oddly enough it was treated as
analogous to an arbitration agreement. The latter were revocable and their
enforcement procedural, and from that it was concluded that agreement to confer
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In the now famous case of Gilbert v. Burnstine"17 a citizen of New
York and another from England entered into a contract wherein they
agreed to arbitrate in London, according to the British Arbitration
Act and according to certain named British rules. The Britisher
demanded arbitration, but the American rested on hishappy thoughts
about extra-territorial protection, due process and the like. The
Britisher, as he could under the English law, obtained permission
from the courts of England to serve the American with notice regard-
ing the arbitration by mail; and the arbitration was held ex parte,
though note the English courts appointed an arbitrator on behalf of
the American. And, lo and behold the New York courts in a suit on
the award by the Britisher held that there could be recovery unless
the defendant could prove that he had not agreed in his contract to a
exclusive jurisdiction on a foreign court should be likewise treated. See for
example Gough v. Hamburg, 158 Fed. 174 (S. D. N. Y., 1907), though compare
the anomalous Mittenthal v. Mascagni, 183 Mass. i9, 66 N. E. 425 (1903) ex-
plained later due to the exceptional nature of the facts. See Nashua River
Paper Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co., 223 Mass. 8, 111 N. E. 678 (1916). Thereis
a full citation of this type of case in (1929) 59 A. L. R. 1445. When the British
passed their arbitration act they treated agreements to confer exclusive jurisdic-
tion on a foreign court as entitled to the protection of the stay section under the
arbitration act. See for example The Cap Blanco, (1913) P. I3O; Australian
Lloyd Steamship Co. v. Gresham Life Assurance Society, (1903) i K. B. 249. See
Dicay, CONFLICTS OF LAWS (Keith's 4th ed. 1927) 549. One federal court decided
that the UNITED STATES ARBITRATION LAW entitled the defendant who had agreed
to the exclusive jurisdiction of a foreign court to a stay of action brought in the'
United States courts. American Tobacco Co. v. Lloyd Triestino, etc., (I92LAt
M. C. 1135 (S. D. N. Y.); (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. I95. Two New York, es
stayed an action in accordance with the arbitration law, Kelvin Engineering Co. v.
Blanc, 125 Misc. 728, 21o N. Y. Supp. 10 (1926); Kipp v. Hamburg-American
Line, 135 Misc. 715, 238 N. Y. Supp. 331 (1929); af'd. 228 App. Div. 802, 239
N. Y. Supp. 914 (ist Dept. 1930); two other cases refused to stay the action
despite the passage of the Arbitration Act, Sudbury v. Ambi Verwaltung K. A. A.,
213 App. Div. 98, 21o N. Y. Supp. 164 (Ist Dept. 1925); Sliosberg v. New York
Life Insurance Co., 217App. Div. 685,217 N. Y. Supp. 226 (ist Dept. 1926).
117255 N. Y. 348, 174 N. E. 7o6 (1931). The reports of the case in the lower
courts reversed by the Court of Appeals, should also be read, 229 App. Div., 170,
241 N. Y. Supp. 54 (ist Dept. 1929); 135 Misc. 305, 237 N. Y. Supp. 171 (1929).
The case is commented on in (93) 1 B. U. L. REv. 426; (1930) 4 CIN. L. REv.
61; (930) 31 COL. L. Rsv. 679, approving decision as preventing avoidance of for-
eign arbitration agreements by staying out of jurisdiction; (1931) 17 CORNELL LAW
QUARTERLY 165, noting the necessity of finding consent to jurisdiction; (930) 43
HARV. L. REV. 653, disapproving lower court decision on the ground that consent to
jurisdiction was obtained in advance; (930) 30 MICH. L. Rxv. 159, thinking case
went pretty far; (1930) 78 U. Pa. L. REv. 9o5, approves lower court decision in
that parties had not agreed to be bound to arbitrate without personal service. Cf.
also Skandinaviska Granit Aktiebolaget v. Weiss, 226 App. Div. 56, 234 N. Y.
Supp. 202 (2nd Dept. 1929).
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British arbitration! The decision is often cited as holding, that an
award rendered by an ex parte arbitration can be enforced in another
jurisdiction; but it did not go nearly that far. Consent to the foreign
jurisdiction is essential:
"The case involves no more than this, whether staying out of
the arbitration, they are bound by an award, made after due
compliance with the requirements of the procedural machinery
established by the British state, unless they are able to show
that no contract has been made ... etc .... "118
While Gilbert v. Burnstine has received the plaudits of the professional
sponsors of arbitration, not so much attention or praise has been
devoted to Shaffer v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Company.n"
There an Ohio exhibitor and a New York distributor of motion pic-
tures agreed in their contract to arbitrate all disputes arising out of it
in accordance with rules seemingly calling for arbitration in New York
and stating "provisions of this contract relating to arbitration shall
be construed according to the laws of the State of New York." Ohio
had not then passed the Draft State Act. The Ohioan, when arbitra-
tion was demanded, failed to go through with the proceeding. Un-
daunted, the distributor held an ex parte arbitration in New York, and
then attempted to enforce the award in Ohio. He was denied this
right in the latter state, on the ground that arbitration being proce-
dural, the exhibitors revocation was valid in Ohio, and the ex parte
arbitration of no avail. Grounds may be found to distinguish the
two decisions perhaps, but a homely and simple explanation of them
seems logical. In states normally holding arbitration agreements
irrevocable, the award of such ex parte arbitration held against the
wishes of another party will be enforced; in states clinging to the old
common law rules of revocability it will not be respected.
Many earnest advocates of arbitration hail the enforcement of
ex parte arbitrations with great delight, especially in these interstate
cases. 120 But they overlook certain vital facts; unless all parties in an
1 255 N. Y. 348, 358, 174 N. E. 7o6, 709 (1931).
1136 Ohio App. 31, 172 N. E 689 (930). The case is commented on in (193o)
3o COL. L. REv. 1198, which admits decision can be logically sustained, but feels it
is not consistent with modem arbitration theory; (1929) 29 MICH. L. REv. 623
thinks Ohio might have found arbitration substantive, but its courts were not able
to administer the provisions of the NEW YORK ARBITRATION ACT; (193o) 6 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 126, supports decision on the New York remedial cases; (193o) 9
TEx. L. Rav. 436, feels lex contractus should govern and case wrong; (1930) 40
YALE L. J. 3O2, thinks court could get opposite result by showing defendant did
not actually revoke arbitration agreement, but questions calling arbitration
statutes remedial.
1 0Note the many appearances amiciae curiae in Gilbert v. Burnstine for exam-
ple. Cf. (930) 30 COL. L. REv. 1198; (1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 679.
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arbitration are agreed on holding the proceeding, it is not a satisfac-
tory one; and ex parte arbitrations have certain obvious defects. 1
But of more importance is the fact that arbitration clauses are in-
serted in order forms, standardized contracts and "take it or leave
it" documents, and if the maker of the contract can provide for ex
parte arbitration in his jurisdiction, as he undoubtedly will, a tremen-
dous amount of unfairness can result and unethical practises ensue.
This is not a theoretical agrument, but one of the utmost practi-
cality.12
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN AND LOCAL AwARDs
In passing, the method of enforcement of foreign awards should be
noted. Since early times statutes have been passed making the
speedy enforcement of the awards of arbitrators possible. At common
law, the only method of enforcing an award was by suit. In order to
gain the advantage of statutory procedure, certain mystic words or
formulae were necessary in the arbitration agreement. But these
statutes were only available for awards rendered within the state and
under the particular statute. An award obtained under the statute of
another state could only be enforced by the common law methods,
slow and cumbersome as they were. Despite all the praise and
publicity given Gilbert v. Burnstine, no one publicly noticed that the
plaintiff was forced to use'the slow common law suit to enforce the
award obtained abroad.H A recent Georgia decision seems to take
1"It is true, that, generally speaking, the obstacles in the way of the arbitrator,
if one of the parties refuses to attend, are so great that it is difficult and sometimes
impossible, for the arbitrator to go on with the arbitration." Doleman & Sons v.
Ossett Corporation, (1912) 3 K. B. 257,264, per Vaughn Williams, L. J.
22We have previously set forth the unfairness of certain types of arbitration,
op. cit. supra note 7, P. 1274ff. The difficulties and hardships are magnified in an
interstate exparte arbitration. A in New York inserts a proper clause in his "take
it or leave it" order forms. A small merchant in Kansas is thus forced to come to
New York to attend the arbitration, or attempt an almost impossible effort to
obtain injunction against it; if he does not come he is certain to lose for the evi-
dence will be all one-sided; if he does choose to come in, it may involve tremendous
expense, and unfairness. The decision in Shaffer v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Co.,
supra note ig, is his only protection, and we favor the decision, not because of
the logic of the court, but because, unless more adequate safeguards are built up
for ex parle arbitrations than exist at present, they are likely to be a weapon of
oppression, and the courts therefore should not aid in their enforcement.
'
2 3See e. g.: "Aiother obstacle has been the difficulty of securing the enforcement
of a foreign award in the United States. This obstacle has been greatly lessened
by... Gilbert v. Burnstine." REPORT OF THE AmERICAN ARBITRATIoN AssocIA-
TION 1926-1931 (1932). The statement is more adequate as propaganda than
accurate as law. Cf. Matter of United Artists Corporation, 135 Misc. 92, 236
N. Y. Supp. 623 (1929); this defect does not seem to exist under the British Act,
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away even the common law method of enforcing a foreign award.
In Wright, Graham &' Co. v. Hammond1" 4 the plaintiff was denied the
right to enforce by common law methods an award obtained in
England in accordance with the British Arbitration Act. The court
concluded it was not a common law award, ex hypothesi, therefore (?)
the remedies of the common law were unavailable; it was not a
Georgia statutory award, therefore speedy statutory remedies were
not available; the only remedy the plaintiff had was to plead the
English statute and have the Georgia court enforce it by the methods
outlined there. The arbitration acts should be amended to extend
the speedy enforcement methods for awards to awards obtained in a
foreign jurisdiction in such a manner as to be in substantial accord
with the arbitration law of the forum. Note, however, that under the
Ohio Arbitration Act,'25 an agreement to arbitrate in a particular.
county in that state, gives the courts of that county irrevocable
jurisdiction to confirm and enter judgment on any award therein
rendered. And under many acts, an award can be confirmed by the
courts and judgment entered thereon without personal service within
the state, provided the arbitration was held in accordance with the
terms of the statute and within the state."' This might lead to great
see REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON THE LAW OF ARBITRATION (1927) §31. Cf. also
Benjamin Co. v. Royal Manufacturing Co., 172 La. 965, 136 So. 19 (1931).
'24I Ga. App. 738, 154 S. W. 649 (1930).
m 0no GEN. CODE (Page, 1932) §12149-8.
"2ARIz. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) §4297; ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses,
1921) §425; COL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. (1921) §318; CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §5849
DEL. REV. CODE (1915) §4501; FLA. Comp. LAWS (1927) §4556; GA. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1926) §5047; ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 20, §9; IOWA CODE (1927)
§12705; KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 6, §112; KY. CODES ANN. (Carroll, 2927)
Civil Prac. §451-7; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) §55; MASS. GEN. LAWS (1931)
C. 251, §9; MIcH. Coip. LAWS (1929) §15401; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §9515;
NEB. COMP,. STAT. (1929) §9182; N. H. PUB. LAWS (1926) as amended by LAws
1929, c. 147; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) §5-2o8; N. D. Coup. LAWS
ANN. (1913) §8332; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) §21-106; S. C. CIV. CODE (1932)
§7041; TENN. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1932) §9365; TEx. REV. CIV. CODE (Vernon,
1928) art. 231; VT. GEN. LAWS (1917) §2077; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 193o) §6161;
W. VA. CODE ANN. (1932) §5501. On the entire subject see West v. Duncan, 72
Colo. 253, 210 Pac. 699 (1922); Sturges & Burn Manufacturing Co. v. Unit Con-
struction CO., 207 Ill. App. 74 (1917); Mitsubishi Goshi Kaisha v. Carstens
Packing Company, 116 Wash. 630,20o Pac. 237 (1921). The cases advance the
doctrine that holding a statutory arbitration under the laws of a state is consent
to the statutes method of enforcing an award. Many of these statutes apply only
to submissions of existing disputes which have previously been entered as a rule
of court, and where so applied are perfectly fair and equitable. Where, however,
the submission need not be made a rule of court, or where it applies to contracts
to arbitrate a future dispute and to a resident of another state, the operation of
such provisions may be vicious to say the least.
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unfairness at times, especially if the arbitration could have been held
ex parte in the first place. Under the laws not mentioned in note 126,
however, after an award is obtained it can be reduced to judgment
only where personal service can be had on the other party.1 27
In spite of the well settled law that the enforcement of an arbitra-
tion agreement is a matter of remedy, the enforcement of an award
has generally been treated as the enforcement of a contract or
judgment, and the validity of the award is determined according to
the law of the place where rendered, it will be enforced,1 28 or if invalid
according to the place where rendered, it will be denied enforcement129
regardless of the law of the forum.3 But if state A, in a mistaken
view of the law of state B holds an award, made in and actually invalid
according to the law of state B, to be valid, a judgment thereon
rendered in state A is entitled to full faith and credit even in state B.'3 '
But note, that when an arbitration has been held ex parte, in viola-
tion of the laws of the enforcing state, there may be some difficulty,
and lexfori may be applied to the arbitration agreement, and not lex
contractus to the award!'
CHECKS AND AIDS TO HARSH ENFORCEMENT
It is possible if an arbitration is proceeding ex partt for the recal-
citrant party to obtain an injunction against it, if it violates any of
his fundamental rights; for example if he never agreed to arbitrate.33
But he cannot place a burden on the party who is proceeding with
the arbitration to make a motion to compel arbitration; he can merely
127Cf., for instance, Matter of United Artists Corporation, 135 Misc. 92, 236 N.
Y. Supp. 62.3 (1929).
"2Thus an award rendered in Oregon, under an arbitration agreement made
there, is enforceable in Washington if valid in Oregon, even though it affects Wash-
ington land and would have been invalid if rendered in Washington. Taylor v.
Basye, ri9 Wash. 263, 205 Pac. 16 (1922), "A contract good in the state where it
is made can be enforced in another state, even though it is not executed with the
formalities required in the latter state." Id. at p. 265, and 16. The doctrine of
the text is supported in Green v. East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad, 37 Ga. 456
(1867); Thatcher Implement and Mercantile Co. v. Brubaker, 193 Mo. App. 627,
187 S. W. 117 (I936) (A Missouri contract for an Indiana arbitration, award
rendered in Indiana, enforceable in Missouri if good according to Indiana law);
Woodrow v. O'Conner, 28 Vt. 776 (x856).
12'Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. U. S., 17 F. (2d) 232 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927).
1"But the foreign law must be pleaded, or it will be assumed to be similar to the
lexfori. Woodrow v. O'Conner, supra note 128.
13Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641 (I9O8).
n2See supra.
"'See Finsilver, Still and Moss v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., 253 N.Y. 382,172 N. E.
579 (I930); In re Ritt, N. Y. L. J., April 18, 193 1.
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enjoin the arbitration until the court determines whether or not he is
in default in refusing to proceed. The New York law was clearly
stated in the denial of a petitioner's motion for an injunction against
an arbitration being held until the other party made a successful
motion to compel arbitration:
"The plaintiff may not, however, impose upon the other party
to the arbitration the burden of making such an application, in
view of the fact that Section 4a expressly imposes that burden
upon the party contesting the validity of the arbitration ...
The language of the Court of Appeals in Finsilver, Still & Moss
v. Goldberg Maas and Company (1930) 253 N. Y. 382, 171 N. E.
579, 'the proceedings will often be kept open by a stay' does
not mean a stay until the defendant moves to compel.. .A proper
complaint (is) for an order staying the arbitration proceeding
until the hearing and decision of an application made by the
plaintiff to determine whether the plaintiff was in default in fail-
ing to submit to arbitration. ' " 4
But a non-resident defendant would be unlikely to come into New
York to obtain an injunction against an ex parte arbitration. Of
course, if he did not actually make the arbitration agreement, he
might then appear to enjoin the arbitration, but assuming that he
made the agreement, but merely objected to coming to New York for
the arbitration, he would have no chance of avoiding the New York
arbitration; in fact if he consented to the jurisdiction of the New York
courts in order to obtain the injunction, the proceeding would prob-
ably end with an order by the New York courts compelling him to
proceed.
On the other hand, if an award is rendered against a non-resident
defendant in one of the New York ex parte proceedings, the award
cannot be enforced against him by statutory procedure in New York,
unless personal service can be obtainedwithin the jurisdiction.13 Even
if personal service is obtained, the defendant may nevertheless urge on
a motion to confirm the award any defense which he could have on a
"'Kanter v. Edward Bloom, I44 Misc. 6o3, 259 N. Y. Supp. 46 (1932); see the
modulations of this case in Interstate Silk Corp. v. M. Salzberg and Sons Inc., N.
Y. L. J. April 14, 1933 and matter of Flintkote Corporation May 5, 1933. Inthe
latter case the court found "nothing in the law which allows a party who refuses
to arbitrate to obtain on a special proceeding a declaratory judgment that there is
no agreement to arbitrate. The theory of the law is that the refusing party may
defend in a special proceeding. If he wants positive relief declaring his rights he
must bring an action." " Cf. Direct United States Cable Company v. Dominion
Telephone Company, 84 N. Y. 153 (1881).
235But cf. supra notes 126 and 127. On a motion to compel arbitration an ap-
pearance to deny the making of an arbitration agreement confers jurisdiction to
order arbitration. Berizzi Bros. v. Krawitz, N.Y. L. J. May 13, 1933.
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motion to compel; in fact, if an arbitration proceeds without a court
order, and one party participates protesting that the arbitration
is held without right, he may still urge his defenses on a motion to
confirm the award. 3 '
There is one saving grace in these interstate contracts providing for
arbitration of future disputes. It is rare that arbitrators are named in
the agreement.137 In which case, an ex parte arbitration cannot be
held, because there are no arbitrators, and unless one comes into the
jurisdiction of the recalcitrant party, and that state has a modem
arbitration act, arbitrators will not be appointed by the court, be-
cause personal service must be made in order for the courts to grant
this relief.3 8
The American Arbitration Association, however, along with many
other trade associations, has offered a standard arbitration clause
which cures this defect. 39 The arbitration clause provides for arbitra-
tion in accordance with certain set rules. The rules provide that the
administering trade association, in the event the parties cannot agree
and have not already provided therefor in the contract, determines
the locality of the arbitration. 40 Furthermore, if the parties cannot
agree on the arbitrators, it appoints them!141 Thus, no need exists to
136Finsilver, Still and Moss v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., supra note 133; In re
Lang, N. Y. L. J., Sept. 8, 1932.
"
7
'"Although the parties may exercise their right to name the arbitrators in the
clause at the time the contract is made, it is not desirable. Under the Arbitration
Rules it is not encouraged, for the following reasons: (I) The names of the arbitra-
tors, when fixed in the clause, make them part of the contract, and they cannot be
removed or the vacancy filled without the written consent of all the parties to the
contract. (2) Persons named in the clause may die or be absent or be otherwise
unavailable at the time a controversy emerges and the difficulty of choosing a
successor in the heart of the controversy is thereby increased. (3) The status of
the arbitrators may have changed, rendering them incompetent or, by reason of
their changed relation to a party, open to the suspicion of partiality. (4) The
arbitration may be held in a place remote from the residence of the named
arbitrators, adding greatly to the expense and inconvenience of their service.
(5) The parties may have selected persons qualified to deal with one class of
controversies, as, for example, questions of quality whereas the controversy that
arises may concern a wholly different question wherein the arbitrators named are
not experts." CODE OF ARBITRATION: PRACTISE AND PROCEDURE (1931) p. 50-51.
'
3 1The DRAFT STATE ACT and the statutes of the states adopting it so provide.
2'3 "Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or
breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration, in accordance with the rules, then
obtaining, of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award
rendered may be entered in the highest court of the forum, state or federal, having
jurisdiction." See CODE OF ARBITRATION: PRACTISE AND PROCEDURE (1931) pp.,
46, 205.
"
0For example R.ULES OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION No. I.
"For example RULES OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION No. IV.
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hpply to the court to name arbitrators; and a party who agrees in
Delaware to arbitrate all disputes thereafter arising out of a contract
according, we will assume, to the "ules of the American Arbitration
Association, may have arbitrators named for him in New York by the
Association, and an ex parte arbitration conducted there. Whether
such is wise and just we leave as an open question; on the one hand,
here are lay arbitration tribunals with wider powers than are pos-
sessed by our courts-on the other hand, why should business be
handicapped by ancient jurisdictional rules, assuming that the
arbitration tribunal is honestly, wisely and fairly conducted. It is
possible, however, though the point has never been raised, that
arbitration clauses providing for the arbitration to be conducted
according to rules may not be absolutely enforceable. As far as the
rules furnishing a procedural guide for the conduct of the arbitration,
there can be no question."" But, whether agreeing to arbitrate
according to rules confers irrevocable powers on the administering
body to appoint arbitrators is something else again. The law pro-
vides that arbitration agreements are irrevocable; it provides a
definite method of appointing arbitrators in the event the parties fail
to do so, or the means selected fails. It does not provide that the
authority of an agent selected to appoint arbitrators is irrevocable.
Is it possible therefore that an extra-territorial arbitration which was..
unfair could be defeated by the party outside of New York, for
example, revoking, not his arbitration agreement-which would be
ineffective in New York-but by revoking the power of the trade
association to appoint an arbitrator.43 Even this could be prevented
by a properly drawn arbitration clause, however. For example, the
clause would provide that all matters in dispute under the contract
would be submitted to the X Association, as arbitrator, in accordance
with named arbitration rules. The problem of the corporate arbitra-
142See, for instance, Blakey Oil and Fertilizer Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 134
Ga. i39, 67 S. E. 389 (i9o9); Thatcher Implement and Mercantile Co. v. Bru-
baker, supra note 128; McDonald v. Real Estate Board of Baltimore, 155 Md.
377, 142 Atl. 261 (1928); Campbell v. Michigan Mutual Hail Insurance Co., 240
Mich. 167, 215 N. W. 4o (1927).
"1See Interstate Silk Corporation v. Kattersman and Mitchell, N. Y. L. J.,
April 28, 1933. And cf. Czarinkow & Co. v. Roth, Schmidt & Co. (1922) 2 K. B.
478; Castle Creek Water Co. v. City of Aspen, 146 Fed. 8 (C. C. A. 8th, I9O6);
Kohlsaat v. Main Island Creek Coal Co., 9o W. Va. 656, 112 S. E. 213 (1922);
Dickson Manufacturing Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 119 Fed. 488 (C. C.
Pa. 1902). But cf. Matter of E. A. Tutien, 249 N. Y. 84, x62 N. E. 592 (1928);
Finsilver, Still and Moss v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., supra note 133; Matter of
Marguiles, N. Y. L. J., March 26, 1932.
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tor, however, is too far outside the scope of this paper to be discussed
further herein.'"
An escape frequently used in New York at present is a contract
with a resident agent of a foreign principal. Of course, an agent must
have authority, either express 145 or implied"' to bind his principal in
the first place to' arbitration, and the implied authority cases are
troublesome. But the mere fact that an agent may bind the principal
to arbitrate does not mean that the agent himself will be thus bound"7
or may represent the principal in an arbitration.1 8 There must be a
specific arbitration agreement with the agent to obtain this result.49
Frequently the business men attempt to obtain an arbitration com-
pelled through a local agent of a foreign principal; their efforts are
generally unsuccessful since they cannot obtain service on the foreign
principal, and service on the agent is worthless, in that he has not
authority to accept it on behalf of his principal and a motion to com-
pel the agent to arbitrate will not be granted because he has not
agreed to do so. It is customary for factors and agents to guarantee
any award which might be rendered against the foreign principal, but
this may not assist the debtor in obtaining an order to compel arbitra-
tion against the agent 50 Other similar agreements used by New
'Cf. e.g., Davis v. Rochester Can Co., 124 Misc. 123,207 N. Y. Supp. 33 (1924).
145 Cf. Campbell v. Upton, 113 Mass. 67 (1873); Morris v. Grier, 76 N. C. 410
(1877); King v. King, 104 La. 420, 29 So. 205 (900).
1"Matter of Caulkins, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 9, 1927. A selling or buying agent
would, under normal circumstances, have authority to bind the principal only if
arbitration were customary in the trade, or in the usual dealings between the
parties. Brosterman v. China Foreign Corporation, N. Y. L. J., July 2, 1929.
"Authority given an agent to buy beans does not give him authority to make a
contract to submit to arbitration. Of course, it might be shown that there were
previous dealings between the parties and that these dealings were in accordance
with known usages of the trade." California Lima Bean Growers Association v.
Mankowitz, 9 N.J. Misc. 362, 154 Atl. 532 (I93I). Cf. Matter of I. M. Fried-
man & Co., N. Y. L. J., Jan. 2, 1934 for authority of a broker to bind his prin-
cipal to an arbitration agreement.
'"Littlejohn v. Demarest, 245 N. Y. 6o5 (1927) (memo.).
148Cf. Wright, Graham & Co. v. Hammond, 41 Ga. App. 738, 154 S. W. 649
(1930).
149And the provision binding the agent to arbitrate must be expressed in very
clear terms. Zucker v. Zongkey, N. Y. L. J., May 15, 1931.
1 01n re Berg Fur Company, Inc., N.Y. L. J., April 9, 1932. "The parties to the
contract calling for arbitration were the petitioner and Lasher, the respondent's
principal. The guarantee executed by the respondent was apparantly intended to
secure payment of any award against Lasher." Contra: Lehman v. Ostrovsky,
N. Y. L. J., Jan. 3, 1934, "to construe the agreement as the agent urges would
make it binding only on the buyer, for the seller cannot be brought into the juris-
diction without his consent. Taking into consideration all the circumstances, the
contract must be construed to mean that the agent would arbitrate and pay the
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York business houses have likewise failed.' The arbitration clause
must contain a clear statement authorizing the agent to represent
the principal throughout the arbitration proceedings and to accept
service of a motion to compel; or a separate arrangement entered into
with the agent at the time of the making of the contract which will
clearly bind the agent to arbitrate.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
To review: A and B have a dispute, and thereafter agree to arbitrate
it. Little difficulty arises in enforcing the agreement. A and B make
a contract, and agree therein to arbitrate any dispute thereafter aris-
ing. A dispute arises, and they voluntarily arbitrate. The proceed-
ing will be successful generally and well worth while. But if the arbi-
tration is compelled or a suit brought be stayed by the mandatory
enforcement statute, unbelievable difficulties ensue. But these are
small compared to the difficulties occurring should A, for example, be
a citizen of NewYork andB of Delaware; and the dispute does not fall
within the terms of the United States Arbitration Act with the narrow
meaning of commerce as defined by our courts. A can sue B in
Delaware and B cannot stop this; B can sue A in the state courts of
New York but the action can be stayed; B can compel A to arbitrate
in New York, and A cannot compel B to thus act; B can sue A in the
Federal Courts of New York and the action cannot be stayed; A can
sue B in the Federal Courts of Delaware; A possibly can hold an
ex parte arbitrationin New York, and B cannot enjoin this, but B
cannot hold an ex parte arbitration in Delaware. And if either of
the parties can find the other in the remaining forty-six states of the
Union, parts of this little game can be repeated, depending on the law
of the particular state; and providing in the contract that the arbitra-
tion shall be held in Delaware leads to another round of difficulties.
Obviously such a situation is too ridiculous to require additional
comment. While it has been caused by the passage of afrts without
proper forethought, that is water over the dam, it certainly is not
aided by the courts' adoption of the "remedial" argument. It is
necessary for clarification.
award." The reasoning of the latter case seems spurious. Contracts are not
generally worked out by implication simply to make for equalized legal process.
See also Biddle Purchasing Corporation v. Yung Hsing Trading Corp., 238
App. Div. 264, 264 N. Y. Supp. 157 (ist Dept. 1933).
15tSee e. g. Silk Service Corporation v. Scism-Beaumount Co. Inc., N. Y. L. J.,
Sept. II, 1930. Note, however, that if the agent is a managing agent, and the
contract provides for arbitration in New York, service on the agent may be
effective as against a foreign principal. Cf. Biddle Purchasing Co. v. Yung Hsing
Corporation, 238 App. Div. 264,264 N. Y. Supp. 157 (ist Dept. i933).
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The insertion of an arbitration clause in contracts where the par-
ties are residents of different states leads to such confusion that its
use is not recommended. But the courts can and must remedy the
situation. A single rule, avoiding the renvoi, for the construction of
arbitration agreements must be made. It is suggested for clarifica-
tion, that the Draft State Acts be amended to provide only for the
specific enforcement of contracts which provide for enforcement under
the particular law involved; and that they affirmatively state that
the law is substantive and not remedial; or for courts all over to adopt
the law of place of performance of the arbitration agreement governs,
and if not stated specifically in the contract, the place of performance
of the contract governs; if there is a conflict in the latter, the place of
making the contract, which conceivably might be a good rule to
adopt for all cases. Any rule which would lead to uniformity is
desirable, and there is no fundamental objection to the courts break-
ing away firom "remedial law-lex for."
State boundaries have caused much difficulty to business men, and
our law with regard to them is obviously in need of change. But
arbitration law is not the place to inaugurate the reform, and the
simply drawn arbitration statutes are not going to change law as
complicated as the one under discussion. The Draft State Act has
simply added another difficulty. A properly drawn Federal Act
could help simplify the arbitration problem. But enthusiastic as we
are about the arbitration process, we cannot but feel that
arbitration is primarily a question of business ethics and psychology.
We have had too much experience in the last decade with attempts to
legislate ethics and psychology by the "thou shalt" method. It
leads to adroit evasion and disregard of law. That is exactly what is
happening to the present mandatory, compulsory arbitration law.1 2
Let us encourage arbitration in its proper place; let us teach the
business men the advantages of it and build up a satisfactory proced-
ure so that they will want to arbitrate; but let us not be blinded by
zeal and fanaticism for the process into adopting the "thou shalt"
philosophy which will lead only to failure and condemnation.
112"It has been thought by some people that once an arbitration statute is
passed, all technicalities would be done away with, and every controversy would
be promptly decided on its merits. Unfortunately this is not the case. Disputes
which would be bitterlycontested in court, will in all probability be contested in
arbitration proceedings. If a party believes that he can obtain an advantage by
a technicality he will avail himself of it irrespective of the tribunal. This is
shown by the records of the courts which contain many instances of litigation
under arbitration agreements having little or nothing to do with the merits."
Poor, op. cit. supra note 4, p. 667. See Isaacs, Book Review (1930) 40 YALE L. J.
149; Skeen, Book Review (1929) 17 CALir. L. Rxv. 191.
